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Introduction.  
In my paper I analyzed in a rather systematic way the linkage between 
international trade and labour rights, with particular reference to the theme 
of social clause as a tool capable of connecting different regulatory regimes, 
namely that of the international labour law and the international economy 
law. Such regulatory regimes have deep common roots that date back to 
the inception of international labour law: the first draft of the British 
delegation in the commission for international labour law, appointed after 
the first World War by the Peace Conference, declared that one of the main 
objectives of International labour conventions should be to eliminate unfair 
competition based on oppressive working conditions and that States signing 
conventions should reject commodities produced under unfair competition 
conditions. This is to say that the linkage deals with a recurrent theme in 
the history of labour law, which has its roots as right of regulation of the 
competition among States and among enterprises, in an epoch in which the 
national economies were compared out of a regulatory frame of the 
international commerce and the  United Nation Society had not been founded 
yet. The links of labour law with this component of the liberal economy - the 
commerce and the philosophy of the free trade - have marked the history of 
the 20th century, with alternate stories and different perspectives. If with the 
foundation of the ILO the respect of the social rights on the part of nations 
was already conceived as a condition for the advancements of the other 
States desirous to progress in the social regulation, the perspective of an 
institutional connection between regulation of the commerce and respect of 
the social rights will find a consecration in the Havana Charter, in which it is 
foreseen expressly that the States adherent to the new Trade International 
Organization must respect equitable conditions of labour. 
The failure of the negotiations of the Havana Charter and the conclusion 
of the GATT will mark a decisive setback of social conditionality as a 
requirement for international trade regulation. Negotiations for the 
foundation of the WTO will be marked by the resurgence of this issue, but it 
will nevertheless find the sharp contradiction of developing Countries, the 
jealous guardians of its elements of competitiveness in a “Ricardian” logic of 
safeguarding the comparative advantages of nations. However, the failure 
of the insertion of a social clause in the WTO does not mark the end of the 
idea and the practice of social conditionality in the treaties of international 
trade, and this for reasons linked to the philosophy that informs the social 
reparation of free trade by two great powers of the global economy, the US 
and the EU. Both these actors have, for different reasons, made the respect 
for social rights a constant element of external relations, with generalized 
preference systems (albeit very different) or in the ambit of bilateral treaties. 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 
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This stage of relaunching the historical link between international trade and 
social rights has been followed by the progressive realization of the social 
clause in the field of macro-regional treaties (NAFTA, CETA, MERCOSUR) and 
finally in the framework of the so-called mega-treaties, such as TTP, TTIP, 
CETA, EPA, with a progressive enhancement of the Sustainable Development 
model as a regulatory framework that can stabilize and institutionalize the 
link between social rights and free trade. 
Today, we are experiencing a slowdown, if not a real crisis of these 
models of regional integration, caused by the resurgence of economic 
nationalisms. Therefore, new questions are going to arise. What is the future 
of global trade in the light of US and Brexit neo-protectionism? What tools 
can be used to convey a new consensus and cohesion phase in the 
international community where development policies, international business 
transactions and social and environmental sustainability coexist 
harmoniously? And what responsibilities, in this confused and fluid scenario, 
must take the economic actors, first of all, the multinational companies that 
move investment and productive locations globally?  
Of course, answering these questions is hard matter. However, I think 
that  
social clauses could be relaunched and find space and unexpected 
revival. The difficulties in negotiating commercial mega-treaties could be 
resolved in a new impetus for bilateral treaties, which China is practicing 
with great determination, assuming for the first time commitments, albeit 
still very temperate, in the field of the protection of social rights and 
environmental issues. The role of the World Bank and of institutional 
investors could be result amplified in this context, by developing a financing 
project and an international cooperation where stabilization clauses 
prohibiting States from amending the existing regulatory framework at the 
time of funding will eventually contain derogations for social and 
environmental rights. And the multinational enterprise, whose social and 
economic power surpasses that of individual national States, could find a 
new planetary legitimacy if it adopted and carry out with seriousness and 
commitment, throughout the production chain, the guidelines contained in 
the new ILO tripartite declaration. Thus, to a destabilizing de-globalization 
guided by populisms, it could oppose a new, more socially oriented 
globalization. 
1. International trade and social rights: the 
justifications for the linkage. 
It is commonly known that the current context of globalization has been 
for several decades  characterized by the expansion of both bilateral and 
multilateral commercial exchanges. The first direction has its evidence in the 
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increase of commercial relations among Countries and it has led to the 
stipulation of a large number of FTAs; in the second direction there has been 
an initial (1990's and 2000's) impulse to economic regionalism, that is to 
say the constitution of free trade areas, customs unions and common 
markets that imply forms of economic integration, which go beyond the 
trade sector, since they refer to issues like services and investments, that 
have been followed (from 2010 to today) by a tendency to the negotiation 
of mega-treaties that have involved several economic areas, like in the case 
of TTIP, CTTP, and so on. This model of free trade has largely dominated the 
global scenario from the foundation of WTO to today. However, in the last 
years, we can see an inversion of this trend: multilateral negotiations to 
bring down barriers to trade have largely stalled and economic and social 
protectionism, linked to an upswing in initiative of National States in the 
global arena, is making a comeback1 . Even Countries that have traditionally 
championed an open global economy, like Us and UK, are now looking into 
ways to put a brake on imports, limit immigration and favour domestic 
production. These developments have all contributed to the recent marked 
slowdown in the growth of global trade, to the point that some experts have 
predicted a future characterized by processes of “de-globalization” and of 
upswing of national States’ sovereignty on economic processes and on 
monetary and trade policies. 
However, in this evolving complex geo-political scenario, whose 
balances are hard to predict, several bilateral and multilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (further on, FTAs) are on the table of negotiations or have been 
recently stipulated. This confirms the will of national States and of economic 
powers to go for the liberalization of exchanges and the integration of 
markets. 
In the field of this free trade perspective, we have progressively 
witnessed a model of regulative “linkage” – or inter-normativity – within the 
economic dimension of trade exchanges that arises social and environmental 
concerns. Actually, we are dealing with a regulative logic that dates back to 
the past: to the failed attempt – with the Havana Charter – to link the ITO 
to the ILO, with the perspective to obligate States to the compliance with 
fair labour standards2. 
This model of regulation based on the linkage between commercial and 
social spheres can, matter-of-factly, be distinguished in two sub-models. 
                                
1 The WTO, OECD and UN Conference on Trade and Development report showed that since 
2008 over 1 500 new trade restrictions have been recorded in G20 economies. Only a quarter 
of these had been rolled back by May 2016.  
2 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, held in Havana, Cuba, in 1947 
adopted the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization which was meant to 
establish a multilateral trade organization.  
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The first, that has its roots in the unilateral commercial policy of the USA 
and is then developed in a multilateral perspective – most of all with the 
NAFTA – is linked to the idea of “fair trade” and sees in the respect of social 
rights a principle of respect of basic conditions for a trade without any 
distortion under the profile of competition (level playing field). Such a model, 
that is characterized by an instrumental perspective directly linked to trade 
and thus dependent to the regulation of exchanges (in the USA internal 
legislation, the practises of non compliance with social rights on the part of 
commercial partners are included in the “unfair” commercial praxis; in the 
NAALC, the social clause works with sanctionatory mechanisms only if the 
behaviour of States is “affecting trade”). The first model is very ambiguous 
under the profile of the identification of social rights, generally defined as 
“internationally recognized” social rights, without any reference to the ILO 
conventions and therefore without a precise setting of supra-national 
standards, but actually very often explicitly linked to the compliance with 
the “internal” standards of each State. 
The second sub-model is to be placed within a wider axiological 
perspective, that is not only and not as much as directly linked to the “fair” 
regulation of trade exchanges’ system, but it is more characterized by the 
promotion of fundamental human rights and values: thus intended to the 
promotion and diffusion on a global scale of certain values of social justice, 
and such a model has its main feature in being based on mechanisms of 
dialogue and cooperation. In this model, where the EU’s GSP probably 
represents the most advanced achievement, the references to the ILO’s 
standards are much more clear, both with reference to the 1998 ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and to the 
fundamental Conventions (core labour standards), with a logic intended to 
the promotion of a supranational system of social standards. This sub-model 
has in the latest years been re-defined thanks to the more and more 
recurring reference in the field of commercial negotiations to the paradigm 
of sustainable development (see infra). One of the main promoters of this 
strategy is the EU, which wants to keep a trade policy which contributes to 
the integrated policy-making of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development by focusing not only on economic aspects, but also furthering 
social and environmental objectives, and contributes to the European 
Agenda on Migration and the European Agenda on Security3. As a matter of 
fact, the planetary triumph of capitalistic economy and the insertion of 
                                
3 Brussels, 13.9.2017 COM(2017) 492 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy 
to Harness Globalisation.  
8 ADALBERTO PERULLI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 147/2018 
national economies within a global market arises again the issue of the social 
dimension of liberalization within international trade in the world scenario.  
Even though they are inspired by different logics, the two sub-models 
coexist, complete each other and can contribute, even if with different levels 
of consistency and efficiency, to the idea of commercial exchanges’ 
governance not only in a perspective of free trade, but also of protection of 
fundamental social rights, in view of phenomena of social dumping, 
regulatory competition and law shopping that constitute at the same time 
the causes and the effects of a globalization without any rule. 
On the background, there is the linkage between liberalization of 
exchanges and labour law, which cannot but overwhelmingly come up again 
in the light of the process of globalization, which entails a growing inter-
dependency among economies, favoured by a strong expansion of the 
movements of capital and trans-national companies within international 
exchanges. 
Moreover, this linkage between the processes of liberalization of 
exchanges and labour regulation constitutes a foundational element of 
international labour law, contemporaneously in the construction of the ILO’s 
normative policy and in the relation between the latter and the economic-
oriented international organizations. In particular, as far normative policies are 
concerned, the function of labour law has been clearly evident since its 
inception: it consisted in contrasting the opportunism of States that would push 
– or actually were pushing – to postpone the protection of workers’ rights with 
respects to the economic or competitive interest of their enterprises. As we 
have already pointed out, the recurring dialectic connecting the norms of 
labour law to international exchanges is presented in the formulation of the 
Havana Charter, forefather of the forthcoming (however, never constituted) 
International Trade Organization (ITO), whereby not only was it provided the 
obligation to comply with equal labour conditions, but, even the necessity of a 
institutional bridge between the ILO and the ITO, in the direction of a profitable 
integration between liberalization and social standards (see below). 
Hence, we face the perspective to insert a social clause in international 
trade treaties that may institutionalize a formal linkage between openness 
of the market, economic and social progress, improvement of labour 
conditions and abolition of the most intolerable forms of exploitation. The 
social clause is at the centre of the debate on globalization and nowadays 
constitutes a very controversial matter, because, if on one hand it may be 
considered one of the most efficient instruments in order to sustain and 
promote the interactions between international trade and social rights, on 
the other hand, it shows many criticalities for its structure and concept. Such 
criticalities may be found even in the most advanced chapters intended to 
sustainable development: in terms of ability to create effective processes of 
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harmonization of social standards (on the contrary, this is often explicitly 
excluded), in terms of effectiveness of the assumed commitments, with 
problems both in terms of monitoring, and, most of all, in terms of 
procedures of controversies resolution and of sanctionatory system, 
therefore risking of being a merely exhortative instrument for social justice 
“on paper”. We will deal further on with these profiles (par. 7). Now we must 
examine the rational “justifications” for the integration of the social clause 
in International trade Treaties. 
In this respect, there are two sets of justifications which can be 
reconducted to a rational justification as regards scope and value. 
1.1. First Justification (Scope). 
The first justification (scope) stresses the economic interest of trade, a 
typically mercantilistic interest, and the instruments of regulation in order 
to overcome market failures, and the limits of rationality of an unregulated 
market. This operative and instrumental justification of regulation looks into 
the harmonious development of the market and is based on the idea of fair 
trade. The protection of the fundamental social norms guaranteed in the 
framework of international trade is justified when the sense of violation of 
those standards by the exporting States is likely to damage the economy of 
those Countries which respect the standard of the supranational “level 
playing field”. Adam Smith himself stated the principle of reciprocity in trade 
relationship. Although it’s been considered as “unilaterally aggressive”, the 
USA praxis, codified in the Section 301 of the 1974 Trade and Tariff Act, 
allows to get to the notion of fair trade, connoting it in a social perspective: 
as a matter of fact, having in mind that regulation, the trade policies of 
foreign Countries founded on the systematic violation of workers’ 
internationally recognized labour rights, represent an unreasonable, unfair 
and inequitable trade practise. It is a trade practice that is considered 
unreasonable, not the violation of social rights per se. It is well known that 
also in the European construction, the social harmonization has been 
conceived since its inception as functional to avoid forms of dumping and 
competition distortions founded on normative disparities, judged as 
inconvenient with regards to the functioning of the internal market. This 
justification is therefore based on a certain idea of a regulated market, an 
ordo-liberal vision in which the adoption of a minimum of internationally 
recognized social norms is a pre-requisite for trade, which can facilitate the 
liberalization of interstate trade by guaranteeing equality of basic legal 
conditions for any economic operator4. 
                                
4 It is important to observe that this conception of loyalty/equity within international trade 
exchanges is today spreading into areas so far considered as immune to this logic, like in the 
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The reciprocal loyalty in the trade relations therefore implies the respect 
of fundamental social rights. It is important to observe that this conception 
of loyalty/equity within international trade exchanges is spreading into areas 
so far considered as immune to this logic, that, on the contrary, have been 
representative of a basically opposite pattern: like in the case of China, 
which has, even though in a limited way, started to insert work-related 
clauses in some FTAs (see infra). 
In this perspective, the introduction of social clauses in international 
trade Treaties has full validity. Such clauses will be able to internalize the 
externalities produced by the liberalization of exchanges and to absorb the 
non-trade issues in the governance of the world trade, on a multilateral and 
bilateral basis. Thus, the notion of fair trade can be considered as a means 
to complete the game of free trade, guaranteeing to the State and economic 
actors that none of the global players will take advantage of the unfair 
benefits that result from the non application of the national or international 
social norms. Social standards therefore penetrate in the regulative sphere 
of trade law as an instrument of implementation of a principle of fair 
competition at the international level, aimed at limiting the phenomena of 
social dumping. 
1.2. Second Justification (Value). 
The second type of justification (value) privileges the axiological 
dimension of fundamental social rights5. In this perspective the demand to 
link social goals and trade agreements is instrumental in “arming” social 
rights by making them accessible to the sanctioning system provided for 
in commercial matters against Countries violating fundamental social 
rights; from this point of view the social clause is a device assisted by 
sanctions that accompanies the other softer measures based on 
cooperation and moral suasion.  
The demand to link trade agreements with social agenda objectives 
recalls the use of general trade sanction towards violating Countries, as 
the suspension or prohibition of market acces for those products which 
violate the foundamental social rights.  
                                
case of China, which has, even if in a very limited way, started to insert work-related clauses 
in some FTAs. Since 2008 China has take a new approach in international trade and some 
FTA such as with New Zeland, Australia include special chapter on movement of person, and 
in FTA with Peru ans Switzerland there are special provison on labour cooperation. 
5 See M. J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade Debate: Protection of Labour Standards and 
International Economic Law, in S. Griller (ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-
Economic Concerns: New Challenges for the International Legal Order, Springer, New York, 
2003, p. 299. 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 146/2018 
An alternative solution, which anyway uses international trade as a 
lever to guarantee the respect of social rights, could be to consider ILO 
Conventions as erga omnes obligations, that, if violated, can lead to the 
use of economic sanctions by States that respect and apply them 
effectively. This opinion has been supported by an authoritative doctrine6, 
but unfortunately could not be accepted because it was unfounded in terms 
of general international law: in fact the ILO conventions are not mandatory 
obligations erga omnes and they are not ius cogens; according to Hobbes, 
these are “covenants without sword”, contrary to humanitarian treaties. In 
fact ILO conventions operate in a reciprocal regime, and subjectively limit 
their scope to the contracting States. Consequently, the use of commercial 
sanctions outside the provision of a social clause would result in the 
violation of international trade law, and would expose the sanctioning State 
to receive sanctions from the WTO in turn. In conclusion according to the 
current state of international law, the only way to go beyond the mere logic 
of “moral suasion” is the social clause, which allows a decisive step forward 
to the promotion of fundamental social rights. 
This axiological perspective is strongly re-launched by the paradigm of 
Sustainable Development. Development is often understood as a synonym 
for economic development or economic growth. Sustainable development 
builds and modifies the international approach to development which needs 
to be understood more broadly. The international community development 
in the past half-century includes at least four related concepts: peace and 
security, economic development, social development and national 
governance that secures peace and development. Each concept is reflected 
in major multilateral treaties that provide a common framework for 
relations among nations as well as a shared set of national purposes. In 
particular, I would stress the idea that Social and economic development 
are closely related, not only conceptually, but also in the practices of social 
and economic relationships. Countries that have emphasized education, 
health and related aspects of social development tend to have the best 
economic performance. Therefore, the link between economic and social 
sphere is not an unnatural invention and it’s not related to utopia or 
ideology. It’s not for nothing that a fundamental Treaty on human rights, 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
contains in itself the idea of integration between economic and social 
sphere.  
                                
6 Failure to respect fundamental social rights, in particular the ILO Conventions, should give 
rise to the right of those who respect them to open their markets only to those States that 
have ratified the same Conventions: see A. Supiot, Quelle Justice Sociale Internationale Au 
XXI Siécle?, Conférence d’ouverture du XXIème Congrès ISLSSL, Le Cap, 15-18 septembre 
2015. 
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Labour law, especially if projected in the international and supra-
national dimension, may therefore be considered as a right of Sustainability: 
the respect of fundamental social rights and, more generally, the conditions 
of effectiveness of labour laws are part of the prerequisites of a globally 
sustainable competition. Whereby we should face their lack, the economic 
development without integration would lead to the deterioration of the 
quality of life in the short term and the consumption of capital in the long 
term7. As Dani Rodrick pointed out, today’s challenge is to make the 
openness of markets sustainable and compatible with wider social aims, and 
this might be achieved even through a re-visitation of the safeguard 
measures of WTO, in order to allow the Countries to react to the violation of 
social rights, especially if those praxis are carried out by non-democratic 
Countries8. 
We may discuss whether this setting should indicate more a cosmopolite 
vision, centred on the generalization of “universal” principles and values9, 
that is to say whether this process should most of all preserve the national 
self-determination against hyper-globalization. In any case, the legitimacy 
of the World trade’s socially conditioned regulation on the basis of double 
rationality (instrumental and axiologically oriented) on which it is founded 
finds growing evidence both in case studies, which confirm its economic 
efficiency (see next chapter), and in the more and more spread and 
politically meaningful matters on the compliance with global norms of 
protection of human rights. 
                                
7 Cfr. M. Giaoutzi, P. Nijkamp, Decision support model for sustainable development, Aldershot, 
Avebury, 1993. 
8 R. Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox. Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, 
New-York – London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2011. 
9 U. Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision, Cambridge, MA Polity Press, 2006 
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1.3. An “integrated” Justification. 
Today, according to this scenario, the  two above mentioned 
justifications have evolved, and in particular the idea of fair trade results 
as more interrelated with the axiological dimension of social rights. Both 
theoretical reflection and the individuation of a much more comprehensive 
normative paradigm of development have contributed to this evolution.  
In this path, an important contribution in the reformulation of 
Sustainability was given by Amartia Sen. Overcoming the thesis of 
economists such as Brundtland and Solow, Sen has definitively explained 
that development must be conceived as a broadening of capabilities of 
human beings and in this perspective the social choice assumes a 
fundamental role in Development. In this way values influence economic 
action making it sustainable. A good example of the recognition of the 
importance of international human rights in the international regulation of 
trade can be found in the CETA Preamble, that provides for the 
implementation of the whole agreement in a way consistent with the 
enforcement of labour and environmental laws (see para 5.2.). 
Sustainable  
Development 
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2. Economic and social rationalities: the positive effects 
of respect for social rights.  
The positive relationship between economic and social rationalities, in 
the field of international trade, is confirmed by empirical evidence. The 
positive effects of social clauses both in terms of economic efficiency and 
protection of fundamental social rights represent a mostly confirmed result 
in the scientific literature of economic matrix. Analyzing the data relative to 
the linkage between social rights and development of trade exchanges in 
India in the period 2005-2014, we can see that the growth of salaries does 
not reduce exportations, but it facilitates internal spending and promotes 
exportations, contradicting the traditional objections on the negative effects 
induced by social conditionality, as well as proving wrong the competition 
issue legitimating social dumping10. Even China, which is promoting a strong  
FTAs policy, has developed a openness in the sectors of cooperation on 
labour and employment, without anyway recurring to international 
standards (like in China-Switzerland FTA) or providing for the protection of 
domestic labour force (like in China-Costa, China-Singapore, China-New 
Zealand FTAs). The references contained in the trade agreements have 
stimulated the protections of social rights, as showed by the total 
cancellation of practises of re-education against ILO Convention n. 105. 
Effective measures in matter of discrimination assumed by the Chinese 
Government show its potentialities to implement social clauses relative to 
condition of labour at a domestic level, with particular reference to principles 
of equal retribution, equality of treatment between man and woman in 
retribution matters and non discrimination (think about the efforts made in 
order to overcome the “Hukou” system, despite the number of migrant 
farmers that keep on being discriminated in the access to labour) 11 . Other 
researches have recently surveyed, on the basis of the Global Preferential 
Trade Agreements Database (GPTAD), the quantitative effects of social 
clauses in Countries with medium-low GDP12 . The confrontation between 
systems that have adopted the social clause and those who haven’t show a 
strong and positive impact on conditionality on the ratification of the ILO 
conventions, especially the fundamental ones, with an average of + 27%. 
Better Factories Cambodia is as well an excellent example of the benefits 
derived from a proper implementation of labour standards. Originally known 
as the ILO Garment Sector Project, it subsequently has changed the name 
                                
10 See H. Chen, Social Clause in Trade Agreements and China’s Experience, in Beijing  Law 
Review, 2015, 6, p. 1 s.  
11 H. Chen, op. cit., p. 7. 
12 R. Baziller, A. T. Rana, Social Clauses in Free-trade Agreements: An efficient tool to improve 
Labour Standard?, 4th Conference on the Regulating Decent Work Network, July 9th 2015. 
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in Better Factories Cambodia to better reflect the ILO's aim of continuous 
improvements in working conditions.13  
Since its establishment in 2001, the program evolved also with the help 
of the trade agreement between Cambodia and the United States14, and 
exports increased over the years, with exception to the biennium 2008-2009 
when trade performance decreased due to the financial crisis. This positive 
impact at a macroeconomic level explains the beneficial outcomes also at a 
microeconomic level. Brown, Dehejia, and Robertson evidence the 
relationship between the factory-level compliance and factory survival.15 The 
analysis confirms that factories that increase compliance with labour 
standards are more likely to survive compared to factories that do not. 
Indeed, the probability of survival grew as firms conformed with the wage 
standards. Productivity and profitability increase as well when working 
conditions are improved. 
At this point, the discourse evolves according to the different levels and 
subjects of such internormative regulation. First of all, it is necessary to 
consider the economic forms of trade organised at global level, which include 
multiple or multidimensional juridical areas, meeting and overlapping. Each 
of these areas should be analysed in accordance with the measure to which 
it can or does guarantee the operative realisation of a link between trade 
liberalisation and respect of social norms, each in its own way. 
In this regards, four pertinent levels or areas can be distinguished: 
i) The global level, governed by the criteria of decision-making 
centralisation and a multilateral framework (WTO); at this level, the 
aggregate and regulative processes typical of social rights are 
generally absent, or else very weak and fragmented. 
ii) Regional level, governed by multilateral and diversified criteria, which 
depend on the intensity of forms of integration. They follow the model 
of the EU or of the NAFTA or other forms of regional integration such 
as MERCOSUR or ASEAN, and vary as to whether there are 
supranational organs with normative and/or judiciary power having a 
direct effect on the Member States. 
iii) The level of bilateral agreements between States, in which the social 
clause is very present. 
                                
13 Hall, “The ILO’s Better Factories Cambodia Program: A Viable Blueprint for Promoting 
International Labour Rights?”, 2010. 
14 ILO, Better Factories Cambodia. http://www.ilo.org/asia/projects/WCMS_099340/lang--
en/index.htm 
15 Brown, Dehejia, and Robertson, “Laws, Costs, Norms, and Learning: Improving Working 
Conditions in Developing Countries,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 10025, June 2016 
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iv) Levels unilaterally governed by States or economic aggregations of 
States; labour issues are often present at this level as the social 
condition for trade liberalisation. 
The following analysis aims to provide a reconstructive synthesis of 
these levels in which, with some differences deriving from the different 
geopolitical and institutional profiles of the regulatory framework, the social 
clause is present in the weaving of international trade relations. 
3. The multilateral global dimension. The GATT-WTO 
system: the origins. 
On 30th October 1947, the General agreement on tariffs and trade 
(GATT) was signed, with the aim to liberalize the international economic 
exchanges, progressively abolishing barriers and customs tariffs. The 
project of constitution of the International Trade Organization, started in 
those years with the editing of the Havana Charter, was, on the contrary, 
interrupted due to the opposition of the USA. In that document, the States 
committed to economic and social cooperation entrusting to what should 
have been the newly constituted ITO the task to promote economic growth 
and, at the same time, the elimination of sub-standard labour conditions, 
especially in export-oriented enterprises, more induced to apply 
unfavourable employment conditions for reasons of international 
competition.  
Above all, in the Havana Charter, in the art. 7, we find the first example 
of social clause: “the Members recognize that measures relating to 
employment must take fully into account the rights of workers under inter-
governmental declarations, conventions and agreements; they recognize 
that all Countries have a common interest in the achievement and 
maintenance of fair labour standards. The Members recognize that unfair 
labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in 
international trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall take whatever 
action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions. 
Members which are also members of the International Labour Organisation 
shall co-operate with that organization, and in all matters related to labour 
norms that will be presented to the ITO, the latter shall consult and co-
operate with the International Labour Organisation”. 
The missed ratification of the Havana Charter on the part of the 
Congress of the USA interrupted the construction of a stable normative and 
institutional order, where to collocate the issue of the social clause. 
Therefore, the GATT was founded on the ashes of the Havana Charter and 
had limited goals and competences, since it did not include any mechanism 
referring to protection and fundamental social rights issues, nor 
recognizing any value to the action of the ILO. From that moment on, there 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 17 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 146/2018 
was a phase of negotiations in trade matters, outside of a pre-defined 
institutional framework; this was interrupted in 1944 when, in the occasion 
of the eighth cycle of multilateral negotiations held within the GATT, the 
World Trade Organization’s institutional agreement was signed among 124 
Countries. The agreement incorporated in a single text the totality of 
negotiations in trade matters according to the GATT system so far 
occurred, and it included agreements relative also to other sectors 
previously not provided for (GATS). The agreement did not contain any 
explicit reference to fundamental social rights even though, on the matter, 
most of all France and the European Commission, supporting the USA’s 
requests, had proposed to introduce within trade agreements some 
provisions intended to internationalize the social costs produced by the 
decisions in matter of international trade. Moreover, the agreement did not 
deal with the cooperation between the WTO and the ILO, that is to say it 
did not acknowledge to the ILO neither the possibility of participation to 
the negotiations, nor the possibility to participate to yearly Rounds, where 
member States meet. 
3.1. The debate on the social clause. 
With social clause we intend peculiar norms having as an object the 
internationally recognized rights that States (in their activity of production 
and application of law) and, consequently enterprises (in their role of 
employers) must comply with, in order to be able to benefit from 
determined effects of international trade liberalization, that is to avoid 
incurring in actual economic sanctions. 
The idea, long nurtured both within law studies and inter-
governmental praxis, refers to the debate concerning the possibility to 
insert a social clause in the field of the system GATT-WTO, in order to fulfil 
the integration of social rights in the space designated to regulate 
international exchanges. As it is known, this perspective presents evident 
criticalities, but just as many potentialities. 
First of all, we are facing the difficulty to define what social standards 
should be, that is to say what are the minimum rules to comply with in 
order for the clause to find its full achievement, in the framework of fair 
trade’s rules. This definition needs an agreement that is way more difficult 
to obtain, compared to the one relative to the adoption of labour 
multilateral conventions in the field of the ILO. However, as it has been 
proved when we examined the “international labour code” elabourated by 
the ILO, a careful analysis of the sources of international law allows to 
explain a hard core of “unconditioned” social rights, that is to say they may 
not be inflected by reason of the different economic and cultural situations. 
These rights have already been contemplated by the ILO’s Conventions, by 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the 1966 UN Treaties on 
political and civil rights and economic and social rights; they have been 
recognized as “fundamental” by the Declaration of Copenhagen on social 
development and eventually consecrated by the historical Declaration 
adopted by the 1998 International Conference of Labour in Geneva. We 
are dealing with freedom of association and right to collective bargaining; 
with the prohibition of forced and mandatory labour; with the protection of 
minor labour; with the prohibition of discrimination. This set of core labour 
standards must therefore be considered of universal application, so much 
so that the ILO requires the compliance with it to member States merely 
by reason of their belonging to the Organization. As we have already said, 
we are dealing with workers’ rights that essentially behave like 
internationally recognized human rights, having most likely an opinio iuris 
on the basis of which the international community results as bound to 
comply with them. For example, to the usage of minor labour in cases that, 
by their nature or circumstances where they take place, put at risk the 
physical and moral health of minors is a praxis to be included in the notion 
of “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments” (art. 1 and 56 of UN Charter) 
whose prohibition is undoubtedly referable to (and sanctionable according 
to) jus cogens. This is to say that the social clause has a codification 
function of already operating principles in the field of general international 
law: the trade treaties that bear it inside should, consequently, be 
interpreted as a confirmation, broadening and specification of already 
existing common norms.  
However, the reason of the difficulties encountered by the social clause 
at global multilateral level is explained most of all according to a political-
structural factor, regarding the conception of the international division of 
labour supported by the WTO, strongly connected to the classical theory – 
dating back to David Ricardo – of comparative advantages. In the ministry 
Declaration of Singapore, the parties declare “to refuse the usage of labour 
norms with protectionist aims and agree that the comparative advantages 
of Countries, in particular developing Countries with low salaries, must not 
in any case be put into discussion”. The principle of comparative 
advantages is founded on the idea of integration of national economies in 
the international division of labour according to competences and according 
to the richness in natural resources, manpower and capital. The WTO has 
therefore inherited – and so far jealously conserved – a conception of 
loyalty within exchanges unable to remedy the trade distortions 
determined by the diversity of national legislations, especially regarding 
the management of labour. 
At the same time, it is true that the interpretations that recognize in 
the social clause a risk of aggressive unilateralism intended to impose 
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protectionist conditions to poor Countries’ trade appear as less and less 
convincing. The objections regarding the lack within the WTO of a tripartite 
structure allowing the participation of governments and social parties in 
the definition and in the application of social standards are not shareable; 
moreover, the background theoretical objections on the utility of exploiting 
market logics in the modernization of international social-economic 
relations are equally non-satisfying. It is actually hard to understand why 
the forced convergence is easily imposed when it comes to obligating 
jurisdictions unwilling to accept non-appreciated trade rules, while coercion 
is not allowed when it comes to protect the workers’ fundamental rights. 
The ILO itself (see above) has solemnly stated within the “Declaration on 
social Justice and a fair globalization”, adopted in Geneva on 10th June 
2008, that “the violation of labour principles and fundamental rights can 
neither be invoked nor utilized as legitimate comparative advantages”, 
thus definitively repudiating the lawfulness of the practises of social 
dumping founded on the theory of comparative advantages. 
The idea of social clause, as a juridical mechanism that goes with the 
liberalization of international exchanges subordinating the fruition of the 
connected tariffs benefits to the compliance with the respect of some social 
fundamental principles, therefore constitutes a perspective to be pursued 
in the field of the international community. It should overcome the 
traditional intrinsic limits of international labour law, thanks to a more 
elevated level of effectiveness guaranteed by trade sanctions to be inflicted 
to the Countries non-complying with the most elementary rules of 
protection of fundamental human rights. The identification of basic social 
rights (id est “fundamental, or “internationally recognized”) through the 
recognition of the norms elabourated by international organizations (ILO 
and UN, first), has allowed to put forward the reconstructive hypothesis 
that considers social clauses not as instruments of disguised protectionism 
(as reported by a lot of developing Countries that oppose to its adoption), 
but as an operational improvement of universally recognized human rights, 
already sanctioned in the field of general international law and, perhaps by 
ius cogens itself. The crucial point of this clause does not consist in 
eliminating the competitive advantages – on a compared basis – of 
developing and transitional economies, but in creating within the system 
of free exchange the necessary requisites in order that the minimum 
conditions of social and Union equality are respected. 
3.2. The compatibility of social clause in the GATT-WTO system. 
Despite the basically unsuccessful outcomes of the debate on the social 
clause, the pressure of industrialized Countries and the critiques by the 
Organizations of consumers, of workers’ Unions and by other NGOs 
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interested in the “social” failures of trade liberalization represent a 
guarantee for the re-launch of the social clause within the WTO. While 
waiting for a development in this sense, it is necessary to verify the 
compatibility of a social clause with the principles in force in the field of 
GATT-WTO, checking the possible actionability of restrictive trade 
measures, adopted by single States with an “anti social dumping” function. 
Regarding this matter, we have a series of extremely interesting 
provisions, whose analysis leads to problematic, though possibilist, results. 
The first problematic aspect regards the fact that the concept of social 
dumping cannot be technically referred to the notion of dumping on prices, 
complying with art. VI of the GATT. In principle, there is no relationship 
between the technical definition of dumping offered by the GATT and social 
dumping (the same is valid for the so-called environmental dumping). First 
of all, the reason of this lies both in the historical and textual interpretation: 
in the phase of negotiation of the GATT, the parties effectively agreed on 
the existence of four types of dumping, relative to prices, services, 
exchanges and to “social” issues (the latter recognized by negotiators as 
“very difficult to define”). However, they opted for a more restricted 
definition, that is to say limited to the dumping on prices, considering the 
forms of non-price dumping as additional compared to the parameters 
posed by anti-dumping norms and avoiding to include workers and their 
Union representatives among the subjects willing to (and for this reason 
qualified, according to the standing rules) propose the action intended to 
activate the anti-dumping procedures. International trade law does not 
recognize the differential cost among producers as a potential cause of 
dumping: in a market economy system the reduction of the price of a 
product is, as a matter of fact, included in the classic goals of free 
competition. On the contrary, international trade law asserts that the 
producer may sell the same product at different prices in the domestic 
market (that is to say, the one of the exporting Country) and in the foreign 
exportation market. Therefore, if the price of the commodity in both 
markets reflects the costs of production, we do not have dumping. We have 
to reaffirm that social dumping is not based on a discrimination between 
the price of sale on the domestic market of the producer and the price of 
sale on the importing market, because also in the domestic market the 
price may be just as much low: we infer that such practise does not 
constitute dumping complying with the General Agreement. 
Closer to the praxis of social dumping is the notion of public 
subsidization to exportations, characterized by the fact that the lower price 
compared to the normal one derives from an help directly or indirectly 
granted by States to enterprises; in view of such praxis, the GATT, in 
addition to allow the injured States to react with the imposition of 
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compensative customs duties (art. VI), disciplines the phenomenon by 
limiting or prohibiting the concession of subsidizations. Therefore, one may 
wonder whether the State allowing national enterprises to violate social 
norms does not end up in granting them a subsidisation; we are dealing 
with a suggestive interpretative hypothesis, provided also in the case of 
environmental dumping, which, however, clashes with textual-oriented 
obstacles, because in this hypothesis we do not have the requisites of the 
subsidization outlined by the relative agreement edited during the Uruguay 
Round, that is to say a financial contribution of the authority and the 
specificity of the subsidization. 
Further, the mechanism of the social clause can be commensurate to 
the so-called “safeguard clause”, conventional provisions that provide for, 
in view of particular situations, the faculty to temporarily infringe to the 
norms of a treaty of inter-State economic cooperation, adopting measures 
of protection such increase of customs tariffs, quantitative restrictions, that 
is to say subsidizations to domestic enterprises. For example, all the 
Countries adhering to GATT-WTO can temporarily limit their importations 
whereby the national production is likely to be disturbed by low-price 
importations (art. XIX). A perspective that sees the safeguard clause 
operating as an instrument to react with protection measures against unfair 
trade practises due to the non-compliance with social standards cannot 
therefore be excluded. 
For this reason, the only norm within the GATT’s corpus that may be 
linkable to a social clause is anyway constituted by the art. XX, relative to 
a regime of dispensations called general exceptions, intended to establish 
a domestic jurisdiction in favour of single States, which are authorized to 
give priority to certain interests of national policy, with regards to trade 
liberalization. In particular, the norm allows the parties to adopt restrictive 
measures of exchanges that are justified by, in addition to considerations 
relative to protection of moral, life and health of people, animal and plants, 
to the defence of environment and of natural resources, to the protection 
of artistic heritage and of the consumer, by reasons linked to the trading 
of commodities produced in prisons (art. XX, lett. “e”). On the basis of 
these provisions, the States may therefore adopt restrictive measures of 
international trade in order to protect their markets from the importations 
of commodities produced with low cost manpower. We are dealing with a 
norm that has never to date been invoked in order to justify such 
restrictions; however it is theoretically very much relevant, since it 
authorizes the States to adopt protectionist measures based on the 
assessment of the production processes of a foreign commodity. The main 
path should therefore lead to the re-formulation of the art. XX, inserting 
new exceptions relative to the missing compliance with certain 
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fundamental social rights; however indeed, an extensive interpretation of 
“the measures necessary to the protection of health and life of people” 
could at least include the prohibition of minor labour and some minimum 
norms of security within labour, allowing the States that suffer from social 
dumping to adopt restrictive measures of importations. 
Eventually, the art. XXIII of the GATT deserves our attention, as 
explained by the Dispute Settlement Rules. The norm, relative to the 
“protection of concessions and advantages, provides for the case in which 
a contracting part considers that an advantage deriving from the 
Agreement is “cancelled or compromised”, or that the realization of one of 
the aims of the Agreement is compromised, due to other parties’ 
behaviours contrary to the Agreement, that is to say that “there is another 
situation” that may cancel or compromise such advantages. Within these 
hypotheses, one party may ask to start an inquiry, which may lead to the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations deriving form the general 
Agreement. An official document of the USA emanated in the 1950’s 
declared that “trade problems stemming from unfair labour standards were 
already actionable under Article XXIII 16“; and the same opinion was 
supported by the Trade Union Congress (TUC), that invoked the recourse 
to the art. XXIII in order to impose trade sanctions to Countries violating 
international standards in matter of labour. This perspective can be 
appropriately updated. As a matter of fact, in the strictly juridical field, the 
reference to the existence of “another situation” that may “cancel or 
compromise” the advantage deriving from the GATT appears so 
undetermined that it constitutes a sort of “general clause” wherein a social 
clause may exist; however, there is no evidence that the art. XXIII was ever 
invoked to fulfil such aim.  
3.3. The perspectives social clauses in FTAs. 
On one hand, we observed the predominance of a market model 
centred on social dumping and on the competition between social systems 
and juridical orders; however, on the other hand, the most recent 
developments, within GATT-WTO and more in general in the international 
dimension, seem to conceal a different idea, grounded on fair trade, 
respectful of rules, principles of equality, solidarity and fairness on 
exchanges; a trade that is founded on the paradigm of equity and not, on 
the contrary, on the competitive devaluation of social regimes which could 
contribute to a sustainable development, as promoted by the recent UN 
Agenda 2030.  
According to a first and more restrictive hypothesis, fair trade alludes 
                                
16 US Commission on Foreign Economic Policy: Staff Papers, 1954, p. 437. 
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to an organization of international trade exchanges that may ensure an 
equal sharing of flows. The “right” quantity of exportations and 
importations for each Country would then be the one guaranteeing the 
equilibrium of the bilateral trade balance with each partner. The issue about 
equality can also be utilized to claim an equal treatment of economic 
actors, according to which Governments should grant to their national 
enterprises the same advantages of their foreign competitors. In this 
acceptation of equality, we can find the idea of a balanced ground among 
players, achievable both through the elimination of unfair advantages of 
foreign enterprises, and through compensational mechanisms. Also in this 
perspective, the idea of fair trade breaks up one of the cornerstones of 
social dumping, that is to say the principle of comparative advantages as 
a foundation of international trade policies. As a matter of fact, social 
dumping, that consists in less strict labour standards within exporting 
fields, is a possible cause of distortion of trade flows, that may be caused 
by a “failure” of the government in the enforcement of labour rights: 
basically it is definable as an “unfair subsidy” that legitimates the activation 
of the procedure to impose compensational duties, according to an 
interpretative line suggested in the cases of environmental dumping, where 
the tolerance of some Countries with respect to environmental degradation 
(particularly typical of developing Countries) would result in a sort of 
subsidization for national industry. 
Considering all this, the idea of fair trade re-launches the above-
mentioned thesis according to which social dumping may be included within 
subsidizations granted by the State, as an attribution of an advantage to 
enterprises that falls on the lower cost of the product. However, in this 
perspective, the usage of the art. XVI of the GATT in social matters – 
according to a perspective put forward also by the International 
Metalworkers Federation and analysed by the ILO’s International Office of 
Labour – presumes such an extensive interpretation of the concept of 
subsidization that it would include in itself the inertia of the State that 
artificially (and with active will) keeps sub-standards labour conditions. 
On the basis of these concepts about the notion of fair trade, the notion 
itself of dumping stipulated by GATT-WTO may appear as obsolete. In the 
previous paragraph, we said that the concept we are analyzing is offered by 
the art. VI, par. 1 of the GATT, which states that dumping “allows the 
introduction of products of a Country on another Country’s market at a lower 
price than their normal value”, whereby the price lower than the normal value 
is such if the price of that given product is “lower than the comparable price 
adopted in the course of normal trade operations for a similar product, 
destined to the consumption in the exporting Country”; otherwise, in the 
absence of such price within the internal market of this given Country, if the 
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price of the exported product is “lower than the more elevated comparable 
price charged for the exportation of a similar product towards a third Country, 
in the course of normal trade operations”, that is to say, “lower than the cost 
of production of this commodity in the origin country, plus a reasonable 
increase for selling costs and the profit” (the so-called normal value, according 
to the principle of fair comparison: art. 2, par. 4 of the 1947 Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of GATT). 
Basically, dumping, as a consequence of a private strategy of the 
producing enterprise, consists in the sale of a commodity in a foreign 
market at a lesser price compared to its normal value, that is to say a lower 
price than the one charged in the market of origin or, anyway, a price 
insufficient to cover production costs. The member States of GATT-WTO, 
and the following interpretative and implementation codes, consider such 
forms of international price discrimination as detrimental both for domestic 
industries and for the opportunities of exportation of third Countries that 
do not practise any type of dumping. Therefore, we would be dealing with 
unfair trade practises carried out by single producers that intend to acquire 
or maintain foreign market quotas through a strategy of price discri-
mination, which tend to provoke distortions within international trade and 
disturbances within the importation market. For this reason, if a commodity 
launched in the market with dumping by a contracting party causes or 
menaces to cause an important damage to an industry (in the sense of 
productive field) of such contracting party, the importing Country will have 
the possibility to neutralize its effect by imposing anti-dumping duties, 
resulting as equivalent or inferior to the dumping margin, that is to say to 
the difference between the price of the commodity in the importation 
market and its “normal value” (art. VI, par. 2). 
This adopted interpretation does not keep into account of what the 
ILO’s International Office of Labour stated and, in particular, of what the 
specific “Group of labour on the social dimension of international trade 
liberalization” stated: the compliance with social norms inserted in the 
Conventions of the ILO could prove that the products destined to the 
exportation and manufactured complying with those norms have been 
introduced with a price non-inferior to their normal value; on the contrary, 
we should presume the existence of social dumping. Therefore, we need to 
define the “normal” level of social protection in just as much objective 
terms as of what happens for commodities’ “normal value”: a value 
coinciding with the assumption of production’s costs that internalize the 
compliance with core labour standards. 
In this perspective, it is thoroughly legitimate to introduce social 
clauses in international multilateral trade treaties: the social clauses are 
intended to the respect of the fundamental Conventions of the ILO, 
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according to lines of reform of the WTO, able to “internalize the 
externalities” produced by the liberalization of exchanges and to include 
non-trade issue in the governance of world trade. 
4. The American Multilateral Free Trade Agreements. 
The virtuous linkage among progressive social policies and 
international trade regulation finds by now several empirical evidences 
starting from the NAALC, North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation, the Agreement parallel to NAFTA, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement among Mexico, US and Canada.  
NAALC as we will see in details,  has favoured a substantial increase 
of the level of knowledge of the reciprocal systems of labour law on the 
part of Unions, Governments, NGOs, managers, academic environment 
and public opinion.  
This linkage has nurtured the development of cross-border 
collabourations between Unions and NGOs; it has produced a climate 
changing among whose consequences we have, for example, the anti-
discriminatory law that explicitly prohibits the praxis (emerged during the 
phase of investigation within the field of the Agreement) to impose 
pregnancy tests to women during the phase of recruitment (12th June 2003 
Act, Federal Official Gazette, 11th June 2003). The ILO itself, which 
recognizes the repercussions of trade and financial policies on employment 
and social rights, hopes for the realization of an “integrated approach” in 
the promotion of decent labour, getting in touch with international and 
regional organizations that have mandates on “connected” issues: 
“d’autres organisations internationales et régionales peuvent apporter une 
contribution importante à la mise en oeuvre de cette approche intégrée. La 
politique relative aux échanges commerciaux et aux marchés financiers 
ayant des répercussions sur l’emploi, il incombe à l’Oit d’évaluer ces effets 
a fin d’atteindre son objectif qui consiste à placer l’emploi au coeur des 
politiques économiques”. In the famous Myanmar case that regarded the 
systematic violation of the ILO Convention n. 29 on the exploitation of 
forced labour on the part of military people, the ILO has promoted the 
adoption of economic measures, like restrictions to importations, the 
sequestration of the regime’s pension funds, the interruption of economic 
subsidizations: these are measures that have been adopted by member 
States against the non-complying government. This confirms that if moral 
suasion does not work, globalization can exploit mechanisms of connecting 
regimes in order to reach goals of social justice. An integrated approach on 
the basis of criteria of conditionality linked to the dimension of global trade 
is on the other hand more and more credited to the internationalist doctrine 
in matter of protection of human rights, of which social rights constitute 
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integrating and inseparable part. 
4.1. The NAFTA and its labour side agreement (NAALC). 
The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) 
represents a peculiar case of social clause adopted in the context of the 
multilateral agreement of free trade among the USA, Canada and Mexico 
(NAFTA). Signed in 1993, it represents the first instance in which the United 
States has negotiated an agreement dealing with labour standards to 
supplement an international trade agreement. 
NAALC is the first free-exchange agreement that sets up a specific 
normative instrumentation intended to encourage the labour protection 
through a procedural mechanism allowing the adaption between trade 
liberalization and the respect of fundamental social rights. By incorporating 
aims that differ from the ones of trade liberalization, the NAALC therefore 
acts as a model for the integration of social values in the supra-national 
processes that regulate economic globalization.  
The main objective of the NAALC is to improve working conditions and 
living standards in the United States, Mexico, and Canada and it promotes 
more trade and closer economic ties among the three Countries. The 
preferred approach of the Agreement to reach this objective is through 
cooperation - exchanges of information, technical assistance, consultations 
- a concept that is explicitly recognized in the very title of the instrument. 
The Agreement also provides some oversight mechanisms to ensure that 
labour laws are being enforced in all three Countries. These oversight 
mechanisms are aimed at promoting a better understanding by the public 
of labour laws and at enhancing transparency of enforcement. The 
Agreement does provide the ability to invoke trade sanctions as a last 
resort for non-enforcement of labour law by a Party. 
With the NAALC, we have the re-affirmation, within a context 
characterized by a weak perspective of integration, limited to the economic 
matter, of a functionalist logic that is very close to the one characterizing 
the primitive European Community experience. However, within the 
NAALC, the techniques and goals of supra-national social regulation 
change. The labour side agreement has as its object surveillance and 
cooperation procedures among partner Countries that may lead, whereby 
the missing compliance with the obligations incurred may entail effective 
competition damages, and actual economic-financial sanctions. Therefore, 
this mechanism may be intended as a social clause that, differently from 
what normally provided for in international trade treaties and in the 
experience of European integration (as well as in the normative tradition 
of international labour law) does not contemplate the respect of minimum 
uniform supra-national standards, but the guarantee of effectiveness of 
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single national social standards. 
In the logic of the agreement, the grounds of the social clause are 
substantially economic: they regard at the same time the regulation of 
competition and the preservation of comparative advantages. As a matter 
of fact, the condition for the application of a sanction is the proof of a 
competitive advantage deriving from the missing compliance with the 
internal labour legislation of a given Country. The art. 3 of NAALC testifies 
the intention of the parties, who promote the “respect and the effective 
application of their own laws in matter of labour through appropriate 
actions of government”: therefore, there is no aim of harmonization or, 
even more, of standardization of the levels of protection in social matters, 
that is left to the national legislator’s discretionality. It is true that the 
agreement individuates some principles; however – as we can see in the 
attachment on Labour Principles, which is integrating part of the agreement 
– they do not represent supra-national social standards, but they indicate 
“guiding values” and “areas of labour law interest” where each Country 
established its own level of regulation. 
A critical profile regards the different protection ensured to the eleven 
Labour Principles 17: the agreement excludes Union rights from the 
strongest level of protection, applying to the violation of the rights of 
organization, collective bargaining and strike not actual economic sanctions 
but the mere activation of “Ministerial Consultations”. Only the violation of 
some labour standards regarding matters relative to security on labour and 
health, minor labour and minimum wage allows the activation of the 
complex procedure of Review that, through the initial experiment of inter-
                                
17 The Annex 1 defines “labour principles” as “guiding values” that the parties commit to 
respect and it individuates them in the following thematic fields: 1) freedom of association 
and right to collective bargaining; 2) right to collective bargaining; 3) right to strike; 4) 
prohibition of forced labour; 5) protection of child and minor labour; 6) protection of minimum 
standards of employment (for example: minimum wages and benefits for extra-hour labour); 
7) elimination of discrimination on labour; 8) right to equal salary among men and women 
working in the same enterprise and having the same task; 9) prevention of professional 
illnesses and injuries on labour; 10) right to compensation in case of illnesses and injuries on 
labour; 11) protection of migrant workers. We are dealing with an all-inclusive list, which 
refers to an editing technique used in other treaties and international agreements (see, for 
example, the twelve principles enounced in the 1989 Community Charter of workers’ 
fundamental social rights), even though, in this case, it results as extremely cautious in the 
individuation of the aspects characterizing the specific cases individuated in order to interpret 
and to apply the regulating norm; in particular, there is no mention of the relative Conventions 
of the ILO, that the Principles therefore respect, but do not refer to. As regards this, it is 
important to point out that such Principles do not set common minimum standards at all, but 
only “wide areas of interest” on which the parties have developed (each its own way) “laws, 
regulations, procedures and practises” intended to the “protection of the interests of the 
respective labour forces”. (Annex 1). 
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ministerial consultations, reaches the summoning of an Arbitrary Panel, 
which may conclude with the provision of financial sanctions. The field of 
operativeness of sanctions is therefore strictly circumscribed: they will be 
active only in he case where the pact violations, in addition to being 
persistent, will result as being “trade-related” and “covered by mutually 
recognized labour laws” (NAALC; art. 49, “Definitions”). In other words, 
not every violation will result as censorable, but only those which, realizing 
in the missing reaction in the field of the respective orders to the violation 
committed by the single economic subjects in order to pursue an undue 
comparative advantage, appear as relevant for the trade-economic 
integration pursued by the NAFTA; further, the missing application will 
have to deal with labour law disciplines that have been acknowledged by 
contractors, regarding the capacity to implement rights and level of 
protection. 
However, paradoxically, all the procedures of violation so far activated 
have as object the violation of Union Rights, while the procedure of Review 
has provided important outcomes, thanks in particular to the summoning 
of public forums of public opinion awareness raising and to the consequent 
“media” sanctions, as well as to the transnational collabouration among 
Union Organizations, within an area where factors non-facilitating the 
international solidarity among Trade Unions are prevailing. Such 
collabouration is stimulated by the necessity that a procedure of 
submission relative to a Country is introduced within the administrative 
structure of another Country, on the part, therefore, of a foreign 
organization.  
The NAALC model, with all its limits, has been therefore appreciated 
by the doctrine most of all for having stimulated the creation of trans-
national links and bonds between Unions and NGOs, within a very 
problematic context, non favourable to the accomplishment of forms of 
international solidarities for workers (see also Bellace relation on the 
matter). 
4.2. The CAFTA-DR. 
The CAFTA-DR agreement18 is the first free trade agreement between 
the United States and a group of smaller developing economies: Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, as well as the 
Dominican Republic. This FTA, signed on 2005, ison the list of free trade 
                                
18 Originally, the agreement encompassed the United States and the Central American 
countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, and was called 
CAFTA. In 2004, the Dominican Republic joined the negotiations, and the agreement was 
renamed CAFTA-DR.  
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agreements where we can find, next to the primary goal of exchanges’ 
liberalization, the issue of workers’ rights and of the conditions applied to 
relations. From the Preamble of the Agreement, we can infer that the 
parties commit not only to the promotion of integration intended in a purely 
economic sense, but also to create new opportunities for the social and 
economic development of the respective territories, in order to protect and 
to strengthen workers’ rights and the cooperation in matter of labour 
among the different institutions involved, in order to create new 
opportunities of employment and to improve the conditions of life and 
labour. 
Examining in particular the chapter dedicated to labour, it may be 
useful to point out that the CAFTA-DR Agreement largely lies on the model 
proposed by the NAALC and by the recent Free Trade Agreements 
stipulated with Australia, Morocco, Chile and Singapore. In this 
perspective, it is therefore in line of continuity with the previous 
experiences, even though we have important signs of the gradual 
acknowledgement of social rights going with economic rationality. 
The agreement may ideally be divided into two parts: while the first 
deals with the references to the structure of protections acknowledged to 
workers and to the instruments that are functional to guarantee their 
effectiveness, the second is intended to add value and promote a 
participative and collabourative model among the different actors that 
intervene in the agreement. 
After the reference to the ILO’s principles stated in the 1998 
Declaration, pointing out that the parties commit both to respect the 
mentioned principles and to apply the internal legislation in order to comply 
with the international norms on labour, the text goes on by acknowledging 
to the participant States the duty not to encourage trade practises through 
the weakening of the structure of protections provided by the internal 
legislation. Further, the States are prohibited, in the attempt to promote 
trade exchanges or to encourage investments in their territory, to apply 
labour conditions that are inferior to those guaranteed by the principles of 
international law. Specifically, as stated in the 16.8, when the Agreement 
refers to “labour laws”, it refers to the norms introduced by the participant 
Countries and directly co-related to internationally recognized principles 
such as the right of association, the right of organization and of collective 
bargaining, the prohibition of utilization of every form of forced labour, the 
minimum age of access to labour, the prohibition and the elimination of 
forms of exploitation of minor labour, the right to acceptable conditions of 
labour and in particular with regards to minimum wage, working hour and 
health and security in workplaces. 
The art. 16.2 introduces an actual obligation for the stipulating parties 
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and, in case of non-compliance, the agreement provides for the activation 
of a procedure that inflicts the non-complying party adequate trade 
sanctions. 
With regards to the instruments introduced in order to implement the 
provisions on the compliance with the ILO’s principles and on the need to 
strengthen the internal legislation in order to guarantee the improvement 
of the workers’ social and professional status, the agreement provides for 
a procedure of guarantee and the State’s responsibility in order to ensure 
those who are interested in, the possibility to address in an impartial way 
to the judicial authority in order to claim their rights. The procedure must 
be equal, free and transparent. The subscribers of the agreement must 
therefore commit themselves so that the holder of a legally acknowledged 
interest in the Country of belonging may address to the judicial authority 
to lay claim to his/her reasons. 
As regards the second part of the agreement, it reflects the intention 
to improve the cooperation and the exchange among the particpating 
Countries as much as possible, so that to monitor the implementation of 
the Agreement and the possible problematic aspects that may arise in the 
applicative phase. In this perspective, we can understand both the 
constitution of a Labour affaire Council (LAC), with tasks of periodic 
verification of the state of implementation of the agreement, of 
coordination among the parties stipulating the agreement, and the 
provision of a system (Capacity Building Mechanism) intended to promote 
and to strengthen the cooperation, to improve labour standards, to favour 
consultations and moments of meeting among the parties. 
Should we have to draw some considerations on the extent of the 
agreement, we could not avoid saying that the part dedicated to labour is 
by all means included in the agreement for free exchange; basically, we 
are not dealing with a simple attachment, but a list of principles that are 
integrating part of the agreement. The attention towards the issues of 
labour has for this reason great autonomous importance, even though it 
must be put into relation with the needs of the market. 
Second, the agreement intends to focus every effort on the 
instruments to guarantee the effectiveness of protections: this is the first 
time that such an issue emerges within a free exchange agreement, 
compared to the totality of the agreements so far stipulated. As it results, 
in fact, from the June 2005 ILO report, in the Countries of Central America 
and in the Dominican Republic, we cannot say that the provisions that 
acknowledge and promote the respect of core labour standards are absent. 
The problem arises, instead, concerning the actual application of the norms 
of protection of workers.  
As a matter of fact, the first labour dispute under any free 
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trade agreement (since 1993, no Country that has signed an FTA with the 
US has never been finded or had its trade privileges revoked, even when 
severe infringements of social rights have occoured) regards the CAFTA-
DR.  
4.3. The MERCOSUR and the Social-laboural Declaration.  
The Mercosur (Common Southern Market) has been instituted on 26th 
March 1991 with an act subscribed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
and later (2014) by Venezuela.   
Venezuela’s new membership was short-lived, however, since by the 
end of 2016 it had already been suspended by the four founding members 
of MERCOSUR. The official reason was Venezuela’s failure to adjust its 
domestic legislation to existing MERCOSUR law. However, deep ideological 
differences and doubts about Venezuela’s commitment to democracy and 
the protection of human rights seem to have been the real driving factors 
for the suspension. The other South American States have obtained the 
status of Associate Member (Chile in 1996, Bolivia in 1997, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela in 2005, and Peru in 2006) and have concluded 
free trade agreements with MERCOSUR (Free Trade Areas). Bolivia’s 
accession as a full member was signed in 2015 but still requires ratification 
at the time of writing (August 2018).  
In the intentions of its founders, the Mercosur, as an instrument of 
economic cooperation among perticipating States, aspired to realize a 
system of free trade through the elimination of duties and restrictions to 
trade exchanges within the involved Countries; however, during the course 
of time, the original project has been widened to encompass also goals of 
coordination of macro-economic policies, the definition of a common trade 
policy and, most of all, a progressive juridical integration of the national 
orders of member States.  
What interests us most is most of all the “Social-labour Declaration” 
elabourated in 1998 after a long and tormented process intended to the 
affirmation of a social and economic identity of the Mercosur and amended 
in 2015, by its own supervisory tripartite body – the Social and Labour 
Commission of the Mercosour – and, as a result, it was approved, as 
amended, in Brasilia, in June, 2015 
The Declaration is a political act, so it lacks direct efficiency but, at the 
same time, it is to be considered a starting point for the development of a 
common and shared social policy within the Mercosur’s member States. It 
undoubtedly represents the outcome of big compromises among the 
opposed interests that lied within the Mercosur, but we should not 
underestimate its extent and effects on national labour markets. In the 
Declaration, there is specific reference to the workers’ fundamental rights 
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stated in the 1998 ILO’s Declaration and in the most important 
international Agreement on the matter 19. Therefore, within the 
Declaration, we find specific reference to the protection of the principle of 
non-discrimination (art.1), the protection of migrant and trans-border 
workers (art.4), the prohibition of minor labour (art. 6), the prohibition of 
forced labour, the protection of health and security in the workplace, the 
freedom of association and of collective bargaining, the prohibition of 
discrimination by reason of Union membership and the right to strike. 
Again, the Declaration states the commitment of the States towards the 
issues of employment, of professional training, of services of sustain to 
employment. The 2015 amendement also ratifies the provisions regarding 
the elimination of forced labour and includes regulation on protection 
against dismissal, on the prevention and elimination of child labour and the 
protection of young workers, as well as any individual rights which had not 
been previously considered, such as provision governing the length of a 
working day, leave and holidays, and the right to a mimimun wage 
according to the national laws, which wage must be sufficient to meet the 
worker’s needs and those of his/her family20.  
With reference to the instruments of implementation of the Declaration 
and of its principles, the parties have provided for the constitution of a 
specific Comision Socio Laboral, with mainly advisory functions, and 
therefore non-sanctionatory, composed of the representatives of 
governments, of Union organizations and of employers. Even though facing 
difficulties, the Commission has carried out an important role in order to 
implement the Declaration, by supporting the action of governments in the 
direction of an economic as well as social integration. 
4.3.1. EU - Mercosur FTA.  
The EU is negotiating a trade deal with the four founding Mercosur 
States - Argentina, Brazil Paraguay and Uruguay, as part of a broader 
Association Agreement between the two regions.  
Negotiations started on 1999, but they stopped due to the Argentina’s 
crisis on 2001 and were suspended until 2010, to restart after the 
protectionist policies started by Mr. President Trump and the appartently 
stop to the TTIP negotiations: the EU would like to find new ways to expand 
its market: The current negotiations cover issues that include tariffs, rules 
                                
19 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1966 International Covenant on Political and 
Civil Rights, 1966 International Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, 1988 
American Convention on human rights and on economic, social, cultural rights. 
20 Goldin A., The MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market): Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, in Perulli A., Treu T. (eds), Sustainable Development, Global Trade 
and Social Rights, Kluwer International,  2018, pp. 41 ss.  
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of origin, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
services, government procurement, intellectual property, sustainable 
development and small- and medium-sized enterprises. The final text of 
the agreement is expected by the end of 2018, even if the last round of 
negotations (the EU and Mercosur negotiating teams met in Montevideo, 
Uruguay, from 4th to 8th June 2018 for a round of negotiations) was not so 
fruitful.  
The 34th negotiation round of the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur 
Association Agreement took place from 9th to 17th July 2018 in Brussels.  
The draft of the agreement text is still not available but we are able to 
find serious commitment by the EU in terms of the promotion of sustainable 
development and social rights. As a matter of fact, it is possible to observe 
from the EU's textual proposals, in line with the EU 2015 Trade for All 
Strategy, when the EU reasserted its ambition to “promote an ambitious 
and innovative sustainable development chapter in all trade and 
investment agreements”, vowing to achieve “far-reaching commitments on 
all core labour rights” and to ensure “high levels of occupational health and 
safety and decent working conditions in accordance with the ILO Decent 
Work Agenda”, even in the context of the Mercosur negotiations as the EU 
proposed to include a Sustainable Development Chapter21.  
In particular, the EU want to enhance the integration of sustainable 
development in the Parties' trade and investment relationship, notably by 
establishing principles and actions concerning labour and environmental 
aspects of sustainable development of specific relevance in a trade and 
investment contex, recognizing the right of each Party to determine its 
sustainable development policies and priorities, to establish the levels of 
domestic environmental and labour protection. Moreover, Parties should 
not weaken the levels of protection afforded in domestic environmental or 
labour law in order to encourage trade or investment or derogate from 
them or, again, fail to enforce labour laws in order to encourage trade or 
investment.  
Then, according to the proposed article dedicated to “Multilateral 
Labour Standards and Agreements”, “The Parties reaffirm their 
commitment to promote the development of international trade in a way 
that is conducive to decent work for all, including for women and young 
people” and each Party shall respect, promote and effectively implement 
the internationally recognised core labour standards, “in accordance with 
the ILO Constitution and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and its Follow-up”.  
                                
21 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/april/tradoc_155481.pdf.  
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As for the ILO Core Conventions for example, all Countries have 
already ratified the ILO Core Conventions, a part from Brazil, which  has 
yet to ratify the the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87). 
4.4. The US Bilateral Free Trade Agreements. 
If we examine the agreements stipulated by the USA following the 
experience of the NAFTA and of the NAALC, we can highlight significant 
progresses in the usage and in the formulation of social clauses. Our 
reference goes, among the others22, to the following agreements: 2004 
US-Chile, 2010 US-Jordan, 2009 United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement 
(PTPA), 2012 US-Korea,that, although being very specific, may be 
considered as virtuous examples of adaptation among economic and social 
goals, confirming the actual will of the participating Countries to seriously 
face the issue of the linkage between social rights and international trade.  
We need to point out the positive innovations of these agreements: 
they integrate the norms on fair labour practices in the Treaty’s corpus 
itself, without recurring to “parallel” agreements like in the case of the 
NAALC; the social standards of reference are specifically those of the ILO, 
where there is no longer a generic and ambiguous reference to the 
internationally recognized rights of workers; labour law therefore becomes 
the domestic benchmark in order to evaluate the efficiency of the internal 
labour regulation; the violation of social norms is compared to the violation 
of fair trade practices by utilizing the same procedural and sanctionatory 
mechanisms. The emblematic cases, like the one represented by the 
bilateral agreement USA-Cambodia in the textile sector (this agreement 
expired in 2004), prove the positive effect of the linkage in the 
development of labour standards (that is to say in the tendency to avoid 
the labour standards’ deterioration) in the sectors covered by the 
Agreement. The project Better Factories Cambodia originallynegotiated 
between the US and Cambodia, provides for a strict connection between 
the expansion of the Cambodian products in the American market and the 
improvement of social standards, with the presence of the ILO as an actor 
in monitoring through inspections and strict reports, as well as in the 
technical assistance to the Cambodian Government. The implementation 
of this model of hybridization between hard techniques (social clause) and 
soft techniques (technical assistance, cooperation) has matter-of-factly 
                                
22 The US has 20 Bilateral Trade Agreements in force today: Israel 1985 (The United States-
Israel Free Trade Agreement was the first FTA entered into by the United States), Canada 
1989, Singapore 2003, Australia 2004, Morocco 2004, Chile 2004, Bahrain 2006, Oman 2009, 
Peru 2009, Jordan 2010, Colombia 2012, Korea 2012, Panama 2012.  
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achieved a promotion of competitiveness founded on the increase of 
working conditions, that have determined an increase of productivity able 
in its turn to compensate the higher costs of manpower, with further 
benefits in macro-economic and political stability terms. After the 
expiration of the trade agreement in 2004, the Cambodian Government, 
together with unions and employers, requested that the ILO set up a 
sustainability strategy to turn Better Factories Cambodia into a self-
financing local institution. The ILO teamed up with the IFC (International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group) to design 
and implement this strategy23. 
5. The EU’s approach to labour rights and social 
standards in the latest bilateral FTAs: TTIP, CETA and 
EPA. 
In the last two decades, in line with the US FTAs we saw, labour 
provisions in EU bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have widened 
and deepened. Over 80 per cent of agreements that came into force since 
2013 contain such provisions24, in order to commit the parties to not lower 
their labour standards or derogate from labour law with a view to boosting 
competitiveness.  
Social clauses have not only grown in number as to become a common 
trait of these trade agreements but have acquired great substantive and 
procedural complexity25.  
This instrument intends to correct abusive practice and offer the dual 
advantage of improving the lot of workers in the exporting Countries and 
protecting the industries of the importing Countries against unfair 
competition. The insertion of a social clause in a trade agreement is actually 
commonly justified for three different grounds: a) the necessity of 
protection of labour right; b) the prevention of the negative effects of the 
so well known race to the bottom of social rights competition in the 
international market; c) the long-term stimulation of economy profits: 
trade agreements boost trade between members of the agreement, 
irrespective of the existence of labour provisions26. As regards this last 
                                
23 https://betterwork.org/where-we-work/cambodia/.  
24 ILO, Studies on Growth with Equity, Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade and 
Investment Arrangements, Report July 2016.  
25 T. Treu, Globalization and Human Rights: Social Clauses in Trade Agreements and in 
International Exchanges among Companies, in A. Perulli, T. Treu (eds), Sustainable 
Development, Global Trade and Social Rights, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 99.  
26 Chen H., Social Clause in Trade Agreements and China’s Experience, Beijing Law Review, 
2015, 6, 1-8, p. 7.  
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point, as demonstrated by the ILO, a trade agreement which includes 
labour provisions actually increases the value of trade by 28 per cent on 
average, similar to 26 per cent for an agreement without labour 
provisions27. This confirms the essentially economic nature of the social 
clause, which deals with the regulation of competition and the preservation 
of the comparative advantages at the same time28, as it has been 
demonstrated that States with better social protection and higher wages 
would not be affected by the unfair competitions from States with low 
wages in the long term.  
So said, the social clause deserves new attention, considering firstly, 
the European trend to conclude more and more multilateral free trade 
agreements, which clashes with the new protectionist policies from the US 
(and the UK); and secondly, as we will see, the tendency to include social 
clauses in FTAs as part of the Chapters generally dedicated to the 
Sustainable Development, with a progressive enhancement of the 
Sustainable Development model as a regulatory framework that can 
stabilize and institutionalize the link between social rights and free trade29, 
as in the case of TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
negotiated with the US), CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement) and EPA (EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement). While 
TTIP negotiations are stopped for the moment (see below), CETA and EPA 
are the two last most important FTAs recently negotiated by the European 
Union with, respectively Canada and Japan, both on the top 10 of the list 
of Countries of trade with Europe30.   
This new US protectionism could be considered as a paradox compared 
to the recent European boost to the FTAs negotiations31.  
Firstly, with Canada (CETA has provisionally entered into force on 
September 2017, but it will enter info force definitely and fully when all EU 
Member States parliaments have ratified the Agreement) and Japan (EPA, 
the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement was finalized on December 
2017). Europe is then negotiating trade agreements with other Countries 
                                
27 ILO, Studies on Growth with Equity, Assessment of labour provisions in trade and 
investment arrangements, Report July 2016.  
28 Perulli A., Sustainable Development, Global Trade and Social Rights: an Evolutionary 
Perspective, in A. Perulli, T. Treu (eds), Sustainable Development, Global Trade and Social 
Rights, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 2. 
29 See Perulli A., Introduction, in A. Perulli, T. Treu (eds), Sustainable Development, Global 
Trade and Social Rights, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 2.  
30 With regards to trade, Canada is the 10th country in the chart of total trade with EU, 11th 
for imports and 12th for exports, while Japan is the 6th country in the chart of total trade, 7th 
for imports and 6th for exports (Source: European Commission, Client and Supplier Countries 
of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade (value %), 2017, excluding intra-EU Trade). 
31 European Commission, Overview of FTA and other Trade Negotiations, Updated May 2018.  
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and regions around the world: if we consider Asia, there are FTAs on the 
table of negotiations with some ASEAN Member States: Singapore and 
Malaysia (negotiations were launched in 2010) Vietnam (June 2012), 
Thailand (March 2013), Indonesia and Philippines (2016) and 
Myanmar/Burma (last negotiations were in April 2017).  Then, as regards 
Oceania, the EU is negotiating by 2017 with Australia and New Zealand, 
while for Latin America with MERCOSUR (last round on March 2018), 
Mexico (the FTA’s text will be finalized by the end of 2018) and Chile (last 
round of negotiations was on January 2018)32.  
Despite the opposite policies from the EU and from the US side, the EU 
is, together with the US, the biggest proponent of linking trade and labour 
provisions33: the two giants of the opposite site of the Atlantic Ocean, even 
if with different tools and manners, have continued to include labour 
provisions in trade agreements, to reach a sort of social trade.  
As a matter of fact, protectionism does not underlie the stronger social 
clause in trade agreements. If historically, social clause was considered an 
instrument put forward by industrialized Countries to raise tariff barriers 
blocking imports with competitive price advantages from developing 
Countries, thereby guaranteeing the market of the domestic companies34, 
is it possible to observe an increasing relevance of labour standards on the 
States free trade agenda, since the mid-2000s. All agreements, negotiated 
by both protectionist and by liberalist Countries, contains a provision 
stating explicitly that labour standards shall not be used for protectionist 
trade purposes, and that the parties should not waive or derogate from 
their domestic labour law to attract trade or investment.  
This is justified also by a new scope and use of FTAs and consequently, 
of the social clause: FTA, signed to reduce or eliminate trade tariff or other 
trade blocks to international trades, are now seen as a solution to the crisis 
and then negotiated and concluded, not only with developing Countries, 
but, on the contrary, between (or among) peer economies, as EU, Canada, 
US and Japan35. The exam of the recent trade policy demonstrated that the 
                                
32 In addition, there are some candidate countries for Free Trade Agreements with the EU 
(Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Morocco and Tunisia) and other Trade Negotiations 
with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China (investment), Services 
(TISA), Green Goods, Trade in Agri-Food and Fisheries Products with EEA/ EFTA countries, 
Association Agreements with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino.  
33 Van Den Putte L., Orbie J., EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour 
Provisions, in International Journal of Comparative Labour Law, 31, n. 3 (2015), p. 263.  
34 Servais, J. (1989), The Social Clause in Trade Agreements: Wishful Thinking or an 
Instrument of Social Progress, in International Labour Review, 128, 423.  
35 Protectionism would disrupt production and increase costs and prices for consumers. 
European exports would become less competitive, putting even more jobs at risk 12. An 
increase in trade restrictions by 10 % is estimated to lead to a 4 % loss of national income 
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inclusion of labour provisions in FTA’s is more and more legitimized in terms 
of human rights and in terms of sustainable development, not to protect 
Countries from social dumping (not only) but to contribute, together, to a 
fair trade, promoting the integration of social provisions and trade 
liberalization36, planning an axiological oriented global order37. 
EU’s approach to labour rights and social standards in FTAs is relatively 
recent: in 1995 it adopted an approach involving both a withdrawal 
mechanism and an incentive mechanism for additional preferences, linking 
trade preferences and labour standards thanks to the Generalised Scheme 
of Preferences (GPS38), which allows vulnerable developing Countries to 
pay fewer or no duties on exports to the EU, giving them vital access to 
the EU market and contributing to their growth. Over time, the approach 
has evolved and the levels of commitments have deepened and widened, 
although there remain important differences across agreements. 
The content of the social provisions relates to social policy and labour 
rights or engage Countries in agreeing not to use social policies as 
protectionist trade measures. There are generally no enforcement 
mechanisms since most clauses are best endeavored in nature but 
nevertheless provide for an ‘implementation’ mechanism done through 
cooperation with its partner Countries and generally (but contrary to the 
GSP+39) EU FTAs do not require the partner Countries to ratify ILO 
Conventions, although specific reference is made to the implementation of 
                                
13. We would lose access to new products, services, technologies and ideas. By hitting the 
poorest hardest with price increases, protectionism would have the opposite of its desired 
effect. According to a recent study of 27 European and 13 other large countries, the real 
income loss from closing off trade would be 63 % for the poorest households and 28 % for 
the richest, because the poor spend a higher share of their income on consumption 
(Fajgelbaum, P. D. and Khandelwal, A. K.,  ‘Measuring the unequal gains from trade’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2016.  
36 A. Perulli, Fundamental Social Rights, Market Regulation and EU External Action, 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relation, 27, 41, 2014.  
37 T. Novitz, Core Labour Standards Conditionalities: A Means by which to Achieve Sustainable 
Development? In J. Faundez, C. Tan (eds), International Economic Law, Globalization and 
Developing Countries, Edward Elgar, 2010, pp. 234 et seq.  
38 The Community GSP scheme was actually introduced on 1 July 1971, applying the principles 
laid down in the UNCTAD generalized system of preferences, which differ from the standard 
GATT rules and the most-favoured-nation clause, and were authorized by GATT by means of 
a formal derogation decision, commonly known as the "enabling clause", which was first 
adopted on 25 June 1971 and renewed on 28 November 1979. The Community GSP scheme 
has, since its introduction, been regularly renewed, with a comprehensive review taking place 
every 10 years. The first such revision was implemented on 1 January 1981, and was followed 
by a more limited mid-term exercise on 1 January 1986. The 10-year revision scheduled for 
1 January 1991 was postponed each year until 1 January 1995, when a new scheme, with a 
link between social provisions and trade, entered into force.  
39 See further.  
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core labour standards. Besides an obligation to enforce labour laws, these 
provisions also require Countries not to reduce their levels of protection 
and encourage Countries to even raise their levels of protection, subject to 
a provision that this is not done for protectionist purposes. Labour issues 
are covered under the rubrics of ‘social aspects’, ‘social matters’, or, more 
recently, to that of ‘sustainable development’, as for the agreement with 
Japan.  
In terms of implementation, contrary to the US approach, the EU 
adopts a more nuanced approach, with a preference for dialogue and 
capacity instead of the previsions of sanctions.   
Let’s then consider three of the most recent and important bilateral 
FTA’s negotiated by the European Union: the TTIP, the CETA and the EPA 
and the EU social approach to those treatyes.  
5.1. The social clause in the US-EU Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
The negotiations between the United States and the European Union, 
in order to stipulate a Transatlantic trade partnership (TTIP) of total 
liberalization of trade and investments between the USA and the EU, are 
currently stopped, due to the change of international trade policies40.  
The US is the main partner of EU trade, the second Country for imports 
(after China41) and the first for exports42. For this reason, those Countries 
started, on 2013, negotiations for a TTIP, a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, in order to revise standards, to evaluate 
compliance and to promote regulatory cooperation in order to maintain 
high international standards and enhance normative compatibility in the 
various economic and productive sectors43.  
                                
40 TTIP’s future is uncertain because the last round of negotiations dates back to October 2016 
and are currently on hold following the change of US Administration. 
41 Negotiations of a comprehensive EU-China investment agreement were formally launched 
at the EU-China Summit of 21 November 2013 in Beijing. The aim of this agreement is to 
remove market access barriers to investment and provide a high level of protection to 
investors and investments in EU and China markets. It will replace the 26 existing Bilateral 
Investment Treaties between 27 individual EU Member States and China by one single 
comprehensive investment Agreement.  
In 2016 the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and 
comprehensive scope for the EU-China investment agreement and established a joint 
negotiating text. The 17th round of negotiations took place in Beijing in May 2018.  
42 European Commission, Client and Supplier Countries of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade 
(value %), 2017, excluding intra-EU Trade.  
43 Perulli A., Sustainability, Social Rights and International Trade: The TTIP, in The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 31, no. 4 (2015), 
p. 473.  
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Despite the success of the various rounds of negotiation, the change 
of US Presidency, on the starting of 2017, marks definitely a change of 
course on American trade policies.  
First, with the stop to negotiations of the TTIP44 (and, more generally, 
of all the FTAs decided by Obama) and more recently, with the war on 
duties started by the US against EU: at the starting of June 2018, the 
Trump administration is putting steel and aluminum tariffs on U.S. allies 
European Union45 (as Canada and Mexico), and the EU has imposed 
countermeasures in response to the US actions, endorsing the decision to 
impose additional duties on the full list of US products notified to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).  
Despite the stop to the TTIP, the analysis of the treaty deserves our 
attention as the TTIP represent a historic step towards the creation of a 
global market ruled by free trade principles. The FTA, once (and if) signed, 
will give way to a “normalization” of the regulative standards and promote 
commercial interchange and investments between the two most important 
economic areas in the world.  
Even if its conculsion is uncertain at the moment, this treaty deserves 
a reflection as regards the approach and the method used by the two 
Parties during the negotiations, and in particular by the EU, as it represents 
a recent and concrete example of the building of a social right chapter in 
the ambit of a trade and investment treaty.   
Under a strictly normative profile, TTIP aims to the revision of the 
standards and evaluations of compliance, enhancing the regulatory 
cooperation, in order to reach high international standards and to increase 
the normative compatibility within the various economic and productive 
sectors. The impact of this agreement in social and work-related terms 
might be remarkable for both continents. Under the influence of the 
liberalization of exchanges, it is believed that the TTIP may create 
hundreds thousand of new jobs, increase salaries and stimulate workers’ 
mobility towards expanding productive sectors. In view of these optimistic 
economic growth perspectives, the TTIP raises a series of social concerns 
linked to the possible (de)regulative competition on fundamental labour 
norms, that such a liberalization may be able to enact. The increasingly 
global processes of liberalization of exchanges and investments have 
produced alarming phenomena of social dumping, so far. They are closely 
linked to a pronounced increase of social inequalities, as a vast empirical 
literature shows, estimating the incidence of commercial exchanging, of 
                                
44 Negotiations are suspended with no chance to continue for the time being. 
45 Those entities had been exempted from the 25 percent tariffs on steel imports and 10 
percent tariffs on aluminum imports. 
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capital transfer and migratory pressure on the increase of inequalities on 
salaries and on the emersion of new poverty areas in advanced Countries. 
Those worries were augmented due to the initial provision of the ISDS 
(Investor-To-State Dispute Settlement) in the Treaty.  
Scholars are debating on the effects of the TTIP, asking whether he 
TTIP, if concluded, will be the liberalistic instrument using commerce as a 
Troy Horse in order to dismantle the social protection, and to extend the 
deregulation, or if it will represent an occasion to re-launch the linkage 
between liberalization of exchanges and social rights, within a value line 
having its cultural and historical roots in the ILO Constitution46.  
Regarding this matter, some crucial questions for labour law are arising 
at all levels of normative production (national, supra-national, 
international), as for each FTA signed: what will be the repercussions of 
such agreement on the system of national industrial relations of member 
States? What will be the impact on European workers’ social rights? What 
will be the measures to be previously adopted to protect European (and 
national) social standards, in view of the entrepreneurial competition and 
the manpower of the USA? In order to answer these regulatory challenges, 
the TTIP negotiators will have to overcome the ambivalences that, most of 
all on the part of the USA, are traditionally connected to the relation 
between “free trade” and “labour” 47, in order to conjugate the trade 
agenda with the new issues of value deriving from the de-nationalization 
of labour law, in the perspective – promoted by the European counterpart 
– of sustainable development.  
We are dealing with needs that include different but convergent ratios, 
that refer both to the planning and the institution of an axiologically-
oriented international order, able to correct the globalization’s undesired 
social consequences, and to regulate the phenomena of the distortion of 
competition that obstructs the optimal allocation of resources.  
This is why the TTIP  shoud conceive a new model of “social clause” to 
be insertedwithin the TTIP’s corpus, developing a confrontation among the 
experiences of commercial integration already present in the global 
market, not only in the field of similar processes of exchanges liberalization 
(NAFTA, Free Trade Agreement), but also in the field of unilateral Trade 
policies linked to the promotion of social rights, (see below about the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) adopted by the USA and the EU). 
                                
46  Cfr. Perulli A., Sustainability, Social Rights and International Trade: The TTIP, in IJCLLIR, 
2015, vol. 32, pp. 473-49.  
47 For historical reference, see ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, Sharing the Wealth. Workers and the World 
Economy, trad it. Governare la ricchezza. Il lavoro nell’economia globale, Carocci editore, 
2000. 
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5.1.1. The TTIP and Sustainable Development. 
The TTIP negotiators decided to dedicate a chapter on Sustainable 
Development and Trade (TSD Chapter), conceived not as an external or 
accidental element of the agreement, but, on the contrary, to “involve all 
the areas of the negotiated agreement”. The aims of sustainable 
development was declared from the beginning of negotiations, starting 
from  the Directive of negotiation on transatlantic Partnership for 
exchanges and investments between EU and USA (17th June 2013). These 
Directives stated that the TTIP’s preamble must take into account that “the 
partnership with USA is based on principles and common values that must 
be coherent with the principles and the aims of the external action of the 
Union”, and contain also: 1. shared values as human rights, fundamental 
freedom, democracy and state of law; 2. the responsibility of the parties in 
favour of sustainable development and the contribution to international 
trade to sustainable development as regarding its social, environmental 
and economic aspects, economic development, full, productive and 
decorous employment, as well as the protection and conservation of 
environment and natural resources; 3. The right of the parties to undertake 
the measures intended to realize legitimate objectives of public policy on 
the basis of the level of health, safety, workers, consumers and 
environment protection, as well as the promotion of diversity of cultural 
expressions.  
There are some precedents in the adoption of external relationships in 
the EU, having as an aim sustainable development, as it has been for the 
CETA (Canada and European Union FTA) and are certainly useful to 
formulate the TDS chapter within the TTIP. As a matter of fact, the EU has 
long since adopted a regulation model intended to combine trade 
liberalization and respect of social rights through the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) 48, the preferential and non-mutual treatment granted 
to developing Countries in the field of trade exchanges, notwithstanding 
the GATT normative 49 (see further).  
The TTIP analysis is useful for our reflections on the protection of social 
rights in the ambit of free trade as the main points of the Chapter on 
Sustainability (which will probably called “Trade and Sustainable 
Development Chapter”) should be the following: 
 
                                
48 F. PANTANO, R. SALOMONE, Trade and Labour within the European Union Generalized System 
of Preferences, Jean Monnet WPS, New York University School of Law, 2008. 
49 See T.M. FRANCK, Fairness in International Law and Institution, Oxford, 1995, p. 58.; L. 
BARTELS, C. HABERLI, Binding Tariff Preferences For Developing Countries Under Article II 
GATT, in Journal of International Economic Law. 
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a) Provision for a mechanisms of Sustainability Impact Assessment 
(SIA) of TTIP in social matters.  
 
The Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) is a DG Trade-specific tool 
for supporting major trade negotiations which provide the Commission with 
an in-depth analysis of the potential economic, social, human rights, and 
environmental impacts of ongoing trade negotiations.In the field of the 
2020 strategy, the EU has provided for all trade initiatives, the activation 
of economic, social and environmental impact assessments, with “specific 
attention to wide consultations and the involvement of the society in the 
sustainability impact assessment that will be implemented in the course of 
the trade negotiations” 50. This impact assessments can therefore 
legitimately be included within the social aims of TTIP, largely contributing 
to re-balance the confrontation between social rights and economic 
freedoms. The Counsel Negotiation Directives are then laid in this 
perspective, providing for a SIA, aimed to verify the TTIP’s impact on a 
social, economic and environmental basis, during the course of the 
negotiation to which the society and all the components specified in the 
agreement will participate (point 33). 
The assessment of the TTIP’s social consequences should disregard the 
terms of drawing up of the agreement, and represent a permanent 
mechanism able to supply ex ante and ex post indications on the effects of 
the Chapter on Sustainable development, providing follow up sessions able 
to indicate the measures to be adopted in order to guarantee the expected 
results 51. Besides, this monitoring impact assessment activity should 
combine with additional review and follow up mechanisms, to be 
considered in the agreement. They should include mutual learning and 
circulation of good procedures, to be adopted on the basis of shared 
guidelines, in the field of an open coordination mechanism, on the basis of 
the EU (MAC) directives to coordinate the labour policies of member 
States 52. 
In March 2017, the European Commission published its position paper  
on the Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of negotiations of the 
                                
50 Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, to the Counsel, to the Social 
and Economic European Committee and to the Region Committee, “Trade, Growth and World 
business. Trade Policy as an essential component of 2020 EU Strategy”. COM (2010) 612 def. 
51 Also according to K. LUKAS e A. STEINKELLNER, Social Standards in Sustainability Chapters of 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, p. 11, “A continuous repeated review of the impact of the 
agreements is also required”. 
52 In this perspective see also T. TREU, Labour and Industrial Relations in the transatlantic Free 
Trade Agriments guidelines, Speech at 21st Nov 2013 meeting at Italian Cultural Institute in 
New York. 
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TTIP53, where it is stated that from the perspective of potential impact on 
social human rights if the projected economic and social results can be 
obtained with full respect for social and economic human rights TTIP is not 
expected to have a negative effect on social and economic human rights in 
the long run – as long as labour and social rights and levels of social 
protection are upheld or increased. In the short-run labour displacement 
could put pressure on the human right to an adequate living as workers 
move from one sector to the other. However, the wage data suggest that 
most mobility will be a consequence of workers being drawn into growing 
sectors that offer higher wages, as opposed to being made redundant 
against their will.  
With regards to the ratification of the ILO Core Labour Conventions  
(the EU has ratified all eight ILO Fundamental Labour Conventions, while 
the US ratified only two), the SIA clarifies that there will clearly be little 
impact on the EU, but for the US there are major roadblocks in terms of 
US law and practice that will impede ratification of these ILO conventions 
within the context of the TTIP negotiation. TTIP is unlikely to lead to the 
signing of any other ILO Fundamental Conventions (other than Convention 
111, which has already been presented to Congress) as ratification by the 
Senate, requiring a two-thirds majority, is improbable. The EU proposal for 
the Sustainable Development chapter includes sustainable commitments 
on labour standards that are comparable to the ILO's core conventions, as 
well as very high standards in other areas. These will become legally 
binding when TTIP enters into force.  
 
b) Provision for a mechanism of permanent monitoring on the social 
effects of the agreement. 
 
Further, the TTIP should contemplate an adequate implementation 
mechanism of the agreement, aimed to monitor its effectiveness and the 
fulfillment of the duties deriving from it, with particular reference to 
provisions of compliance with international obligations (ILO’s Declaration 
on fundamental social rights). In this perspective, the agreement should 
contemplate the constitution of an independent committee of experts, with 
an ILO member with consultative function and having the following roles: 
a) editing of periodic reports on the state of effectiveness of social 
standards, to be compiled taking into consideration the information 
                                
53 European Commission, European Commission services' position paper on the sustainability 
impact assessment in support of negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade & Investment 
Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America 31 March 2017. 
http://www.trade-sia.com/ttip/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017/03/TSIA-TTIP-Final-
Report-03-17.pdf.  
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transmitted by governments and other institutions; b) gathering and 
assessing any complaint, editing recommendations, promoting 
consultative forums to exchange information among governments, social 
parties and other stakeholders (on NAALC model); c) with reference to the 
latter, the transatlantic communication should be duly institutionalized 
through the creation of a Forum for Trade Investment and Sustainable 
Development, which should regularly represent the location where the 
social matters linked to the TTIP should be publicly discussed. We need to 
observe, on the USA side, that an interest in monitoring related to 
promoting effectiveness profiles of the commitments undertaken in the 
trade field, is at the basis of USA’s foreign policies in trade and 
investments. 
 
c) Social Clause 
 
Although the agreement in matter of labour may be conceived in wider 
and more ambitious terms than a mere “social clause”, and it may by all 
means provide for soft mechanisms of spreading of good praxis among the 
parties, my opinion is that the TTIP should contain also an actual social 
conditionality clause, to be implemented in the field of the mechanisms of 
enforcement of the agreement and, in particular, to be appealed before a 
dispute settlement body, on the model of WTO 54 and of what provided by 
the FTAs. An authoritative indication about the above mentioned topic, 
relative to the adoption of a real social clause, with the contemplation of 
any possible trade sanctions, can be found on the Counsel Negotiation 
Directives, where it is indicated that “the agreement must include a clause 
on general exceptions, inspired by art. 20 and 21 of the GATT” (art. 12).  
As we have already mentioned, thanks to art. XX of the GATT, which 
deals with a dispensation regime named “general exceptions”, a reserve of 
domestic jurisdiction in favour of the single Countries is adopted. They are 
authorized to prepose some national politic interests to the obligations 
deriving from trade liberalization agreements. In particular, the norm 
allows the parties to adopt restrictive measures concerning exchanges that 
are justified by considerations relative to the protection of public moral, of 
life and health of people, animal and plants, to the respect of laws and 
internal regulations, to the defence of environment and natural resources, 
to the protection of the artistic heritage, and of the consumer, for reasons 
connected to the trading of commodities produced in jail. Therefore, thanks 
                                
54 See E.-U. PETERSMANN, The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1995, p. 207 The literature on this issue is extremely huge. 
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to the art. XX of the GATT, States are authorized to adopt restrictive 
measures of international trade (restrictions to exportations: embargo, or 
to importations: boycott) in order to protect their markets from the 
introduction in the internal market of products realized with low-cost 
workforce 55. Indeed, the reference contained in the negotiation Directives 
to the necessity of contemplating in the TTIP a clause on “general 
exceptions” inspired to art. XX of the GATT can represent an important 
occasion of reflection for negotiators, in the editing of a series of general 
exceptions linked to the respect of the commitments undertaken in the 
chapter dedicated to labour and sustainability: they should recognize to 
the parties the faculty of taking the appropriate trade measures against 
the violation of fundamental social rights and social dumping. 
5.2. Labour Provisions on CETA: the “Trade and Labour” Chapter. 
The importance of the CETA is linked both to the central position of 
transatlantic trade and to the historic relations also in social traditions 
between the two areas56.  
In the CETA, as all the other recent FTAs, the Parties recognise that it 
is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
reducing the levels of protection afforded in their labour law and standards 
and they shall waive or derogate from its labour law and standards, to 
encourage trade or the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention 
of an investment in its territory, or, again, shall not fail to effectively 
enforce its labour law and standards to encourage trade or investment57.  
As we can see, the Parties use, as it is for most of the FTAs recently 
concluded, an aspirational language, and, despite the commitment to keep 
the levels of protections for workers, it remains the problem to find the 
proof to show a link between the lowering of domestic labour standards 
and the intention to encourage trade or investment.  
What is new, is the position of these provisions in the text, which 
suggests, as we will see, a new function of this tool in the context of free 
trade.  
As a matter of fact, those social clauses are inserted in Chapter 23, 
dedicated to “Trade and Labour”. We should observe that the previous 
                                
55 Cfr. Wto Appellate Body «]apan-Taxes on A/coho/ic Beverages», report 4th October 1996, 
Dor. Wl’/OS8/ABIR, e «Canada-Certain Measures Concerning periodicals», Doc. 
Wl’/OS31/ABIR. 
56 T. Treu, Globalization and Human Rights: Social Clauses in Trade Agreements and in 
International Exchanges among Companies, in A. Perulli, T. Treu (eds), Sustainable 
Development, Global Trade and Social Rights, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 109. 
57 Article 23.4 CETA, Upholding levels of protection.  
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Chapter (22), is entitled “Trade and Sustainable Development”, while the 
Chapter 24 “Trade and Environment”. 
Since 2008, the EU’s FTAs have included ‘sustainable development’ 
chapters: the first agreement was the EU-CARIFORUM Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the Carribean Forum58, which contains 
numerous provisions relating to aspects of sustainability and human rights. 
Partly inspired by US and Canadian FTAs, these three chapters contain 
obligations requiring signatory Parties to comply with labour and 
environmental standards (including ILO core labour standards), and, 
conversely, not to use labour and environmental regulation as a means of 
economic protection. It is worth to note that while the EU tends to combine 
these issues under one single sustainable chapter, the US and Canada deal 
with labour and environment issues in two separate chapters in their FTAs. 
As a result, the EU-Canada FTA contains three chapters to cover these 
issues: one on labour, one on the environment, and one on sustainability.  
The intention of EU and Canada is to recognize that economic 
development, social development and environmental protection are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of sustainable 
development and reaffirm their commitment to promoting the development 
of international trade in such a way as to contribute to the objective of 
sustainable development, for the welfare of present and future 
generations59.  
Consequently, the implementation of Chapters Twenty-Three (Trade 
and Labour) and Twenty-Four (Trade and Environment), the Parties aim 
to: (a) promote sustainable development through the enhanced 
coordination and integration of their respective labour, environmental and 
trade policies and measures; (b) promote dialogue and cooperation 
between the Parties with a view to developing their trade and economic 
relations in a manner that supports their respective labour and 
environmental protection measures and standards, and to upholding their 
environmental and labour protection objectives in a context of trade 
relations that are free, open and transparent; (c) enhance enforcement of 
their respective labour and environmental law and respect for labour and 
environmental international agreements; (d) promote the full use of 
instruments, such as impact assessment and stakeholder consultations, in 
the regulation of trade, labour and environmental issues and encourage 
businesses, civil society organisations and citizens to develop and 
                                
58 Schmieg E., Human Rights and Sustainability in Free Trade Agreements. Can the Carifourm-
EU Economic Partnership Agreement Serve as a Model? In German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs, SWP Comments n. 24, May 2014.  
59 Art. 22.1, par. 1, CETA.  
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implement practices that contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development goals; and e) promote public consultation and participation 
in the discussion of sustainable development issues that arise under this 
Agreement and in the development of relevant law and policies (art. 22.1, 
par. 3, CETA).  
It is easy to observe that Labour and Environment are treated and 
considered of the same value, as it is suggested by the same concept of 
Sustainable Development the three dimensions (also called “pillars”) of 
Sustainable Development, (social, environmental and economic one) are 
of the same importance and mutually reinforcing60, and it is assumed that 
Sustainable development is only possible if all these pillars are taken 
account of.  
5.2.1. CETA and ILO provisions. 
The CETA labour chapter “Trade and Labour”, contain also some 
obligations dealing with the ILO but, differently from the past FTAs, they 
do not refer directly to the ILO’s Fundamental Conventions. Rather, 
reference is made to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998), to the ILO Declaration on Social 
Justice for a Fair Globalisation (2008) and to the ILO Decent Work Agenda.  
The commitment is to respect (a) freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective 
abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect 
of employment and occupation but also (a) health and safety at work, 
including the prevention of occupational injury or illness and compensation 
in cases of such injury or illness; (b) establishment of acceptable minimum 
employment standards for wage earners, including those not covered by a 
collective agreement; and, (c) non-discrimination in respect of working 
conditions, including for migrant workers (art. 23.3, par. 4) but there is no 
special and direct reference to the ILO Conventions.  
Despite the lack of reference or mention to the ILO Core Convention, 
each party reaffirms its commitment to effectively implement in its law and 
practices in its whole territory the fundamental ILO Conventions that 
Canada and the Member States of the European Union have ratified 
respectively and the Parties “shall make continued and sustained efforts to 
ratify the fundamental ILO Conventions if they have not yet done so”.  
                                
60 Treu T., Labour Law and Sustainable Development, WP CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona”.INT-
130/2016; Cagnin V., Diritto del Lavoro e Sviluppo Sostenibile, Cedam Wolters Kluwer, 
Milano, 2018.   
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5.2.2. CETA and Monitoring of Implementation. 
In line with the soft European approach in terms of sanctions, the EU 
and Canada did not insert in the agreement a special mechanism for 
sanctions in case that labour commitments are not respected. The Parties 
decided to foresee a special Committee, the Committee on Trade and 
Sustainable Development, which shall oversee the implementation of those 
Chapters and can also carry out its duties through dedicated sessions 
comprising participants responsible for any matter covered by the Chapter 
on Trade and Labour (as well as for that on Trade and Environment).  Any 
decision or report of this Committee shall be made public and the 
Committee shall present updates on the implementation of the Chapter to 
the Civil Society Forum.  
This Forum is composed of representatives of civil society 
organizations established in their territories and shall be convened once a 
year unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. The Parties shall promote a 
balanced representation of relevant interests, including independent 
representative employers, unions, labour and business organisations and 
environmental groups (art. 22.5 CETA).  
In particular, with the involvement of trade unions, through the Civil 
Society Forum, social clauses can become in this way a mean to spread 
practices of transnational collective bargaining at a regional level, 
promoting the social dialogue between European and Canadian social 
partners. At the same time, this Forum could be the way to overcome the 
aspirational language used (i.e. parties “shall not derogate…”) and would 
facilitate the court or the inspectorate’s intervention in labour disputes, 
reinforcing thus the effectiveness of these social provisions, which lack, of 
a specific sanctions mechanism.  
As a matter of fact, social dialogue is recognized as an important issue: 
they also recognise the importance of social dialogue on labour matters 
among workers and employers, and their respective organisations, and 
governments, and commit to the promotion of such dialogue (Art. 23.1 
CETA). In this perspective, the Social Clause could be considered as a tool 
to improve international social dialogue, as the parties of a FTA recognise 
the importance of social dialogue on labour matters among workers and 
employers, and their respective organisations, and governments, and 
commit to the promotion of such dialogue. 
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5.3. Labour Provision on EPA: the “Trade and Sustainable 
Development” Chapter. 
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)61 is the biggest 
bilateral trade agreement ever negotiated by the European Union: EU firms 
already export over €58bn in goods and €28bn in services to Japan every 
year.  
The EU-Japan economic partnership agreement comes at a time of US 
President Donald Trump’s erratic trade policy. This trade agreement with a 
strategic ally can send a strong message in favour of an open and rules-
based trade order. In addition, it gives the EU trade agenda a strong 
opportunity to take the lead in the Asia-Pacific region. The Economic 
Partnership Agreement will open huge market opportunities for both sides, 
strengthen cooperation between Europe and Japan in a range of areas, 
reaffirm their shared commitment to sustainable development, and include 
for the first time a specific commitment to the Paris climate agreement. 
All the labour clauses (or provisions) are inserted in Chapter 15 “Trade 
and Sustainable Development”, thus following the EU’s approach.  
This chapter is in line with the level of ambition of the chapters 
concluded in others recent EU FTAs. Notably, at the starting of the Chapter, 
EU and Japan recognise that its purpose is to strengthen the trade relations 
and cooperation between the Parties in ways that promote sustainable 
development and they clarify, first of all, that the agreement “is not to 
harmonise the environment or labour standards of the Parties” (Art. 16.1, 
par. 2, EPA).  
Then, the Chapter provides for commitments like the prohibition of 
relaxing domestic labour laws to attract trade and investment (“The Parties 
shall not encourage trade or investment by relaxing or lowering the level 
of protection provided by their respective environmental or labour laws and 
regulations. To that effect, the Parties shall not waive or otherwise 
derogate from those laws and regulations or fail to effectively enforce them 
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a manner 
affecting trade or investment between the Parties”, art.16.2, par. 2), nor 
for discrimination or restrictions to trade’s purpose: (“The Parties shall not 
use their respective environmental or labour laws and regulations in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination against the other Party, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade”, art. 16.2, par. 3).  
                                
61 The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement was submitted for the approval of EU 
Member States on 18 april 2018. Once approved by the Council, the agreement will be sent 
to the European Parliament. The text of the Agreement is available here:  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156423.pdf.  
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5.3.1 EPA and ILO provisions 
EPA refers to the commitment to the key international instruments on 
labour, such as the effective implementation of the 4 groups of ILO core 
labour standards as covered by the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
principles and Rights at Work, a continued and sustained progress towards 
ratification of non-ratified fundamental ILO Conventions (art. 16.3, 
International labour standards and conventions).  
Thus, in this case, the ratification of the ILO Convention has not been 
a condition, a prerequisite for the negotiations of a bilateral trade 
agreement with the EU.  
5.3.2. EPA and Monitoring of Implementation. 
The Agreement, as CETA did, constitutes a Committee on Trade and 
Sustainable Development (art. 16.13), which shall be responsible for the 
effective implementation and operation of this Chapter, (a) reviewing and 
monitoring the implementation and operation of the Chapter and, when 
necessary, making appropriate recommendations to the Joint Committee 
(representatives of both Parties) for its consideration, (c) interacting with 
civil society (independent economic, social and environmental 
stakeholders, including employers’ and workers’ organisations and 
environmental groups) on its implementation and (e) seeking solutions to 
resolve differences between the Parties as to the interpretation or 
application of this Chapter.  
The EPA provides to include mechanisms for the involvement of civil 
society in the implementation of the chapter, both domestically 
(consultation of “domestic advisory groups62” ) and jointly (“joint dialogue 
with civil society”, which means independent economic, social and 
environmental stakeholders, including employers' and workers' 
organisations and environmental groups); and a tailored mechanism for 
the resolution of disputes, including governmental consultations and 
recourse to an independent panel of experts63. 
 
 
                                
62 Also foreseen on CETA, art. 24.13.  
63 European Commission, EU-Japan EPA – The Agreement in Principle, 6 July 2017 - report 
submitted to Member States and to the European Parliament, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155693.doc.pdf  
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6. The Generalized Preferences System: the EU 
experience as an exemplar model of positive linkage 
between international trade and social rights.  
After this reconstruction of the framework of social provisions in the 
latest FTAs, we can observe that it is difficult to see a real enforcement 
mechanism in order to oblige parties to respect all the important 
commitments taken in terms of social rights. If it is true that, both for CETA 
and EPA (as for the TTIP), labour provisions have widened and deepened 
compared to the past, but we need to observe that they are mostly 
cooperative and non-binding provisions.  
FTAs use an aspirational language, and for this reason labour 
provisions risk to lack of an effective remedy to labour violations or of a 
valid deterrent. This is, unfortunately, in line with the EU traditional 
policies.   
As a matter of fact, the only agreement where economic and clear 
sanctions are imposed, is the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), 
an exemplar model of positive linkage between international trade and 
social rights in the European external action64: in this context, any of the 
GSP Industrialized Countries, on request by the UN, have granted a 
preferential and non-reciprocal treatment to developing Countries in 
matter of trade exchanges. Such scheme, (GSP), by granting a facilitated 
access in the European Market to commodities coming from weak 
territories, represents a mechanism of distributive justice in the system of 
international trade with a general extent.The EEC has matter-of-factly 
granted since 1971, notwithstanding the GATT-WTO normative that 
provided for a unique system of preferences, some generalized tariff 
preference for industrial finished and semi-finished commodities coming 
from developing Countries, authorizing a more advantageous customs 
treatment compared to the one normally practiced, and consisting in the 
total or partial elimination of import duties. 
Twenty years after the concession of the above-mentioned measure, 
the Council, being aware of the positive results achieved in the course of 
time, has adopted the Reg. 3281/1994. In the new regulation, the need to 
co-relate international trade with the respect of fundamental social rights 
overwhelmingly emerges and, in this sense, the tariff-related instrument 
shows great potentialities. On the same line are the following regulations 65. 
Initially, there were two types of measures provided by the 1994 
                                
64 Perulli A., Clausola Sociale, Enciclopedia del Diritto, Giuffré, 2014, vol. VII, pp. 187-211.  
65 Reg. n. 1154/1998, Reg. n. 2810/1998, Reg. n. 2501/2001, Reg. n. 980/2005, Reg. n. 
732/2008, Reg. n. 1063/2010, Reg. n. 978/2012. 
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Regulation. 
First of all, the advantages are to be temporarily, totally or partially 
cancelled in case the Country involved resorts to forced labour, in 
accordance with the ILO’s Conventions on the matter 66, as well as in case 
of exportation of commodities produced in jail. The temporary cancellation 
is not automatic, but it will be active after a procedure that may be 
activated through a report of the violation to the Commission. 
If, in this case, we are dealing with a negative sanction, the second 
measure provided by the Regulation is, on the contrary, a promotional 
sanction, which consists in the concession of a special “regime of 
stimulation”, whose aim is to promote the addressee Countries in the 
adoption of more advanced social policies. 
Starting from 1st January 1998, following the Reg. n. 1154/98, some 
additional preferences was granted (equal to an extra 20%) to those 
Countries already admitted to the GSP, which prove to have adopted – and 
actually implemented – the eight fundamental Conventions of the ILO  
Even though the GSP is unilaterally adopted by the EU, it is important 
to underline that the Council grants the potential extra-measures on the 
basis of criteria that must be acknowledged and shared at international 
level, as well as by reason of a report of the Commission that keeps into 
account the results of the surveys carried out by the ILO, the WTO and the 
OECD. 
In this way, we have the promotion of an unprecedented mechanism 
of control based on the cooperation among several international 
organizations, which could be considered as the potential backbone of a 
system of promotion of any hypothesis of future insertion of social clauses 
in trade treaties. Given the specific reference to the ILO’s Conventions, the 
European System results as particularly virtuous and inclined towards an 
international trade policy complying with fundamental social rights. 
The following Regulation (EC) n. 732/2008 of the Council 67 has then 
simplified the special regime of subsidization, by substituting the three 
previous regimes with the current two: the special regime in favour of 
developing Countries and the special subsidization regime of “sustainable 
development and good governance”, acknowledged only to the Countries 
that have “ratified and effectively applied” the Conventions referring to the 
attachment III (among which we have the 8 ILO’s fundamental 
Conventions) and that commit themselves to “maintain the ratification of 
the Conventions and of the relative laws/measures of implementation and 
                                
66 1930 Convention n. 29 on forced and mandatory labour; 1957 Convention n.105 on the 
abolition of forced labour. 
67 Regulation (EC) n. 732/2008 of the 22nd July 2008 Council, relative to the application  
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to accept periodical assessments and re-examinations of the application, 
complying with the provisions of implementation of the ratified 
Conventions”.  
Actually, Regulation n. 978/2012 68  provides for a general regime, and 
two special regimes, that is to say the special regime of subsidization for 
sustainable development and good governance and the one in favour of 
less developed Countries. 
The first special regime (GSP+) is an agreement of particular 
subsidizations for sustainable development and good governance that 
recognizes total exemption from customs tariffs for commodities entering 
the EU’s market for Countries that have ratified and implemented a series 
of Conventions of the ILO and the UN in matter of labour and human rights, 
and in matter of environment and of good governance, and that accept a 
constant monitoring. 
The second special regime, which provides for the cancellation of 
customs tariffs, is called EBA, which stands for Everything But Arms: such 
program, reserved to less developed Countries, guarantees the total 
cancellation of customs tariffs for all products coming from such Countries, 
except for weapons. 
With this new Regulation we see the concentration of tariff preferences 
“on the support to developing Countries more in need in the field of 
development, trade and finance” .69. The goal is to strengthen the 
subsidizations for the respect of fundamental human and labour rights, the 
environment and good governance norms through the GSP system, 
increasing its predictability, transparency and stability: in this sense, the 
length of the programme is increased from 3 to 10 years, with the 
exception of the EBA, which has no deadline. 
7. The US Preference Programs.  
The USA adopt different agreements in order to support third 
Countries, especially developing Countries, allowing a preferential access 
                                
68 EU Regulation n. 978/2012 of European Parliament and of 25th October 2012 Council, 
relative to the application of a system of generalized tariff preferences and that abrogates the 
EC Regulation 732/2008 of Council. The Regulation 732/2008 provided for a scheme of 
generalized tariff preferences for the period from 1st January 2009 to 31st December 2011, 
extended to 31st December 2013 by the GSP Roll-over Regulation, Regulation n. 512/2011. 
The new Regulation is active from 1st January 2014. 
69 Recital n. 7 of Reg. 978/2012. The new Regulation intends to reduce, starting from 1st 
January 2014, the benefitting Countries of the preferential system, from 176 to 89. The 
Countries that already have a different preferential access to the EU’s market will be excluded, 
that is to say the Countries that the World Bank ranked as “high-income or medium-high 
income” Countries, in the course of the three consecutive years immediately prior to the up-
date of the list of benefitting Countries. 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 55 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 146/2018 
to the USA’s market. 
One of the most relevant preferential programmes is the GSP 
(Generalized System of Preferences) instituted by the 1974 Trade Act to 
promote economic growth in the developing Countries and was 
implemented on January 1, 197670, and recently extended71.  
The USA system of generalized preferences is a programme intended 
to promote economic development and growth in the developing World: it 
supplies a preferential exemption from customs tariffs for more that 3000  
commodities coming from 120 beneficiary Countries (including many least-
developed beneficiary developing Countries (44)72. 
In the original 1974 text of the Trade Act were already indicated the 
reasons that could justify the exemption form the tariff benefit (in 
particular for Countries with dictatorial regimes, that is to say they did not 
cooperate within the international war to drug trade, or they were still 
considered as supporters of international terrorism). With the 1984 
amendment, other causes of exclusion were added: the most relevant was 
the social clause stating that the Countries aspiring to the preferential 
regime must prove to being complying with internationally recognized 
labour standards. Actually, a GSP beneficiary must have taken or is 
taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights, including 1) 
the right of association, 2) the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour, 4) 
a minimum age for the employment of children, and a prohibition on the 
worst forms of child labour, and 5) acceptable conditions of work with 
respect to minimum wages, hours of work and occupational safety and 
health. A GSP beneficiary must implement any commitments it makes to 
eliminate the worst forms of child labour.  
In 1985, the USA elabourated an additional programme of tariff 
preferences, contained in the 1985 Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation Amendment Act. There was the constitution of a Governmental 
                                
70 U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Guidebook, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative Executive Office of the President Washington, D.C., March 2017, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/gsp/GSP%20Guidebook%20March%202017.pdf.  
71 On March 23, 2018, the President signed into law H.R. 1625 (Public Law 115-141), the 
“Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018,” which in addition to providing full-year federal 
appropriations through September 30, 2018, extended GSP with retroactivity, for goods 
entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption from January 1, 2018 through 
December 31, 2020. The new Act also provided for the retroactive refund of all duties (without 
interest) to the importer of record (IOR) on GSP-eligible goods entered during the January 1, 
2018 through April 21, 2018 lapse period. 
72 See General Note 4 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule for the most up-to-date number 
of GSP beneficiaries: https://hts.usitc.gov/current .  
 
56 ADALBERTO PERULLI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 147/2018 
Agency, controlled by the State Secretariat, in charge of supplying services 
of financing and insurance of capitals coming from North-American 
companies and employed in projects of foreign investments (most of all in 
developing Countries). Also in this system we have a social clause stating 
that “the company may ensure, re-assure, guarantee or finance a project 
only if the Country involved proves its compliance with internationally 
recognized labour rights”.  
We need to highlight the interventions of the USA’s Government in 
order to favour the economic development of the Countries facing the 
Caribbean Basin. On the basis of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the 
missing compliance with internationally recognized social rights is 
impedimental to the conservation or the ex novo attribution of the relative 
tariff concessions.  
In the same perspective is to be read the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act, promoted in 2000 in order to guarantee a duty free 
treatment to the commodities coming from 40 States of sub-Saharan 
Africa, in view of the respect of a series of standards also in matter of 
labour. 
8. Fundamental social rights in the external action of 
EU.  
As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, if the operational 
justification on which the social clause is founded results as difficultly 
practicable by the State at a multilateral global level, on the contrary, it 
appears as functional to the development of the regional and/or bilateral 
integration. As a matter of fact, we find again important examples of social 
conditionality both in the field of the European construction, and in the 
framework of the North-American Trade Integration (and, in particular, 
centre-south-American), and in the bilateral Free Trade Agreements, which 
confirm the will of States to affirm the linkage between social rights and 
international trade, overcoming the several ambiguities within the previous 
trade treaties 73. 
In the European construction, the social harmonization has been 
conceived since its inception as functional to avoid forms of dumping and 
competition distortions founded on normative disparities, judged as 
inconvenient with regards to the project intended to ensure a harmonious 
development of the internal market. For this reason, the European social 
                                
73 See. M.A. CABIN, Labour Rights in the Peru Agreement: Can Vague Principles Yield Concrete 
Change?, in Columbia Law Review, 2009, p. 1047 s.; for a synthetic analysis see K. LUKAS, A. 
STEINKELLNER, Social Standards in Sustainability Chapters of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, 
Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, Wien, June 2010. 
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law has followed a functionalist rationality, instrumental to the service of 
the common market. Within a functionalistic vision of integration, the aim 
established by the common market’s founders was to avoid a competition 
to the bottom in the application of social standards, contrasting the ongoing 
deregulation due to structural deficits and to the lack of common references 
to a minimum threshold of fundamental social rights.  
Currently, the functionalistic vision of integration is being overcome 
thanks to the redefinition of the basic normative references of treaties – 
particularly after Amsterdam – and to the constitutionalisation of 
fundamental social rights. The field of social rights has progressively 
broadened and the consideration of such rights – from being subordinate, to 
take part in the process of economic construction of Europe – has 
considerably increased to get to an equal level with the basic principles of 
economic integration. Forced to penetrate the communitarian juridical order 
thanks to the activity of the Court of Justice, social rights have then 
established themselves in the Charter of fundamental social right of the EU, 
becoming, with the Lisbon Treaty, common constitutional references in 
social matters. In this way, they were able to lay the normative basis to 
overcome that sort of schizophrenia consisting in the promotion of the 
respect of fundamental social rights in the framework of external relations, 
as well, as for example, with the Generalized Preference System, observing 
structural deficiencies in the internal field. The cyclical sequences of events 
of the so-called European Social model outline a scenario where the issues 
of labour and employment never came before the scenario of the market 
integration, related to strictly economic values and for these reasons at the 
basis of a growing mistrust and scepticism of European citizens towards 
Europe and its institutions 74. Nevertheless, with the development of a 
“holistic” conception of European integration 75, culminating in the Lisbon 
Treaty, the goals of full employment, social progress and social cohesion are 
definitely re-launched in the perspective of a new “strongly competitive 
social market economy”, characterized by the fight against social 
discrimination and exclusion, and in favour of the equality between men and 
women, of inter-generational solidarity and of the protection of minors’ 
rights. 
8.1. Social rights in the construction of the EU: the perspective of 
the horizontal social clause. 
In pursuing these non-trade goals, the Treaty on the Functioning of 
                                
74 For a general overview see S. SCIARRA, L’Europa e il lavoro. Solidarietà e conflitto in tempi 
di crisi, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013. 
75 See P. CRAIG and G. DE BURCA, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, OUP, 2008.  
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the European Union (TFEU) contemplates, for the first time in the history 
of the European integration, a provision, defined by commentators as a 
“horizontal social clause” (art. 9), that is the expression of a new Social 
Mainstreaming in the field of a strengthening of the above mentioned 
axiological orientations, expressed by the art. 2 and 3 of the TFEU. It is 
evident that with such provision, to which the Commission attributes a 
fundamental value 76, we are facing goals that include social and 
personalistic values that become part of the economic fabric and that do 
not result as dismissible in the intention to promote a balanced and 
sustainable development of the market. The clause introduces a sort of 
social conditionality in the “actions” and in the “policies” of the EU, 
consisting in respecting obligations deriving from the compliance with 
social values: it establishes, in fact, that “in the definition and the 
implementation of its policies and actions, the EU keeps into account the 
needs linked to the promotion of an elevated level of employment, the 
guarantee of an adequate social protection, the fight against social 
exclusion and an elevated level of education, training and protection of 
human health”. This principle of social conditionality is reconnected with 
other horizontal clauses in the Treaty, relative to the equality between men 
and women, the protection of environment and the protection of 
consumers and the fight against discrimination (art. 8, 10, 11, 12 TFEU). 
Although the expression “keeps into account” is less intense with regards 
to other provisions contained in these final horizontal clauses (in particular 
the one referring to the art. 11, according to which the needs linked to the 
protection of environment “must be integrated” in the definition and in the 
implementation of the policies and actions of the EU), the perceptive value 
of the social clause is obtained both from its collocation in the title II 
(Provisions having General Applications) 77, and from the essentiality with 
regards to the action of realization of the paradigm of market social 
economy, otherwise destined to lacking in meaning or to being merely 
programmatic. Commentators should move in this perspective within the 
discussion whether the horizontal social clause has prevailingly political 
and/or interpretative orientation value for Courts and address value for the 
EU’s organisms, or whether we may hypothesise a precise justiciability 
pertaining to the horizontal social clause. In fact, only if the this option 
prevails, the art. 9 of the TFEU may correctly be included among social 
clauses in a strict sense, characterized by a sanctionatory lato sensu 
                                
76 Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, to the Council, to the Social 
and Economic Committee and to the Committee of COM Regions (2010) 608 def. 
77 In this sense, see F. Lecomte, Embedded Employment Rights in Europe, in Columbia Journal 
of European Law, vol. 17, p. 1 ss. 
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component, which overcomes the perspective of the mere moral suasion 
in giving shape to the economic activity. In this sense, it is important to 
point out that the clause imposes to the institutions of the EU, and in 
particular to the Commission, to report on their initiatives in the framework 
of the obligation of providing grounds ex art. 296, par. 2 of TFEU; as if to 
say that an act contrary to the content of the social clause – because, for 
example, detrimental for employment or for social protection – may be 
cancelled because not complying with the Treaties, pursuant the art. 263 
of the TFUE. 
As being horizontal, such clause must be employed in order to 
introduce social goals in all relevant sectors, economic and trade policies 
included, as well as in order to monitor the impact of policies in a logic of 
integration and coordination in economic, social, employment and 
environmental fields. In such perspective, the social clause provides to the 
Institutions of the Union a wide mandate to include a series of social goals 
in all policies, the initiatives and the activities pertaining the EU, 
transforming the social development of Europe in a cross-wise task, able 
to overcome the historical asymmetry between development of the 
market’s economic integration and social sphere 78. The European 
Commission, to whom the Lisbon Treaty has entrusted the task to promote 
the general interest of the EU (art. 17 of the TFEU), must guarantee that 
the social clause is efficiently applied and that all documents, as well as 
the pertinent judiciary texts, actually refer to it and keep it into account, 
making sure that it effectively contributes to the pursuing of the new goals 
of the Treaty, both on the part of the EU and of the member States. In 
particular, according to the statements of the European social and 
economic Committee, this clause must be applied to the general fields and 
to the global architecture of the new social-economic governance of the 
EU, provided by the 2020 Europe Strategy, and approved by the European 
Council in 2010. The art. 9 of the TFEU therefore provides a new juridical 
basis to the already existing Social Impact Assessment, an ex ante 
assessment procedure of the policies inaugurated at the 2002 Laeken 
European Council and later confirmed with the 2005 Lisbon strategy for 
development and employment. With the 2009 guidelines, the Commission 
has adopted an ambitious mechanism of social impact assessment in the 
                                
78 According to the Opinion of the European social and economic Committee on the matter 
“Strengthening the cohesion and the coordination of the EU in the social field thanks to the 
new horizontal social clause, referring to the art. 9 of the TFEU (initiative opinion), 24th June 
2012/C, lecturer Lechner, the implementation of the social clause may “therefore contribute 
to reduce the sense of dissatisfaction that has long been persisting and to overcome the 
deeper and deeper scepticism of some member States with regards to the added value offered 
by the EU, in particular in terms of economic, employment and social progress”. 
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areas of labour market, standards and rights linked to the quality of labour, 
social inclusion, equality of treatment and non-discrimination, access to 
social protection, education and health system, health and public security. 
Particular attention is addressed to the re-distributive impact on poverty 
and social inclusion, both within member States and with regards to 
member States, especially developing Countries, concurring to the goal of 
guaranteeing the respect of the provisions of social policy contained in the 
Treaty of Lisbon (in particular the articles from 145 to 166 and the art. 168 
of the TFEU) and in the EU’s Charter of fundamental rights (in particular 
the chapter IV on Solidarity), to which the art. 6 of the European Single 
Act has recognized the same juridical value of the Treaties. The innovation 
may therefore crucially contribute to re-balance the confrontation between 
social rights and economic freedom that are object of a jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice that tends to favour a trade-related perspective. 
Recently, this tool has found another base of legitimation with the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, which has been proclaimed by the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on 17 
November 2017. As a matter of fact, art. 9 TFEU is recalled on the Preamble 
(p. 2) of the Solemn Declaration of the Social Pillar. The Pillar, in this sense, 
demonstrates a new sensibility to the horizontal social clause, and this 
approach is in line with the recent European Court of Justice jurisprudence, 
which for the first time, in 2016, expressely named the horizontal social 
clause in a case where there was a need of balancing enterprise freedoms 
and social rights (C-201/15, Aget Irarklis, p. 78-79).  
The general comments of the doctrine have regarded the 
consequences that the examined horizontal social clause can and must 
have with reference to the internal market. However, the examined clause, 
as being horizontal, pertains to all the policies of the EU and for this reason 
also to the ones relative to the Union’s external relations. The EU, as 
regional entity with a “global vocation” in the promotion of human rights 79, 
now has a new normative basis to be employed in order to mobilize all the 
governance instruments available in the social field. A field being 
particularly fertile – and by all means coherent with the horizontal social 
clause – regards the promotion of the values contained in the UN Guiding 
Principles on business and human rights that include the OECD Guidelines 
on multinational enterprises, the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility Standard, 
the UN Global Compact, and other instruments of internationally 
                                
79 See M. CREMONA, Rhetoric or Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a Multilateral 
Context, in Comm.mar.law rev., 2001, p. 359; T. NOVITZ, In search of a coherent social policy: 
EU import and export of ILO labour standards?, in J. Orbie & L. Tortell (eds), The European 
Union and the Social Dimension of Globalization, Routledge, 2009.  
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recognized Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), such as the recently 
updated  ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises on Social Policy80 but also the UN Agenda 203081.  
The involvement of the EU in the development of the project UN 
Protect, Respect, Remedy (that represents the most important point of 
global reference for CSR policies) 82 constitutes an important example of 
this process that involves the European Parliament and the EU delegations 
within international organizations. The horizontal social clause should be 
able to provide a greater impulse to the EU’s external action, required by 
the NGOs that invoke the commitment of the Union within the re-launching 
the responsibility of multinational enterprises operating in the European 
territory for the violations of human rights carried out by their homologous 
outside the EU. In particular, these social guidelines should connect to the 
common trade policies providing, for example, a normative basis in order 
to realize principles of CSR in the field of initiatives (lacking preceptive 
value) already developed in other contexts such the “Communication on 
the promotion of labour fundamental norms and on the improvement of 
the social governance in the context of globalization” and the 
Communication “the partnership for employment and growth: make 
Europe a centre of excellence in matter of CSR”. Hence, we have the 
Union’s commitment to promote CSR at a global level, by working in order 
to include within the Union’s bilateral agreements norms of sustainable 
development and to support specific initiatives like Global Compact and the 
so-called Kimberley process. Further, the art. 9 of the TFEU may provide a 
decisive incentive in order to implement the Resolution of the European 
Parliament adopted on 25th November 2010, in the field of the promotion 
of social values within multilateral Courts of international trade, concerning 
the implementation of a principle of extraterritoriality stating that a 
Country of origin may require the compliance with its social legislation also 
                                
80 The MNE Declaration is the only ILO instrument that provides direct guidance to enterprises 
on social policy and inclusive, responsible and sustainable workplace practices. It is the only 
global instrument in this area that was elabourated and adopted by governments, employers 
and workers from around the world. It was adopted close to 40 years ago (amended in 2000 
and 2006) and revised in 2017. Its principles are addressed to MNEs, governments, and 
employers’ and workers’ organizations and cover areas such as employment, training, 
conditions of work and life, and industrial relations as well as general policies. All principles 
are based on international labour standards (ILO conventions and recommendations). 
81 Communication from the Commission A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European 
Union Strategy for Sustainable Development (Commission's proposal to the Gothenburg 
European Council); COM/2001/0264 final.  
82 UN Special Representative on business and human rights, UN “Protect, Respect, Remedy” 
Framework, http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-
Remedy-Framework. 
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to the enterprises operating outside their territorial field 83. Other fields 
where to adopt initiatives under the sphere of the art. 9 are linked to action 
of coordination in areas of interest, such as the common policies on 
investments, which must be guided by the principles and goals of the EU’s 
external action 84, the specific policies on minor labour 85, on forced labour, 
on human beings trade, and on the due diligence in the mining sector. With 
reference to the external action, social rights start being considered as 
relevant issues in the field of the dialogue with third Countries, for example 
with Cambodia, Laos and China 86; further, in the field of initiatives 
intended to guarantee the respect of the ILO’s agenda on Decent Work and 
in the field of the relationships of international cooperation, like in the case 
of Bangladesh 87. Therefore, we may expect an incentive to the promotion 
of fundamental social rights towards the exterior of the EU, thanks to the 
insertion of “CSR clauses” in all trade agreements stipulated by the Union  
on the wake of the usage of another horizontal clause, already present in 
the normative fabric of the prior-to-Lisbon Treaties, relative to the 
promotion of sustainable development (current art. 10 of the TFEU), which 
has contributed to insert the issue of sustainability in the field of the EU’s 
external trade relations. According to the European Parliament, such CSR 
clauses, to be inserted in the trade agreements to come, should force 
enterprises to assume obligations of due diligence intended to the adoption 
of precautionary measures of compliance with human rights in their 
outsourced branches, with the obligation to periodically publish the balance 
sheets in matter of CSR. 
9. Social clauses in Trade Agreements: a disaggregate 
analysis. 
At this point of the paper, I would like to propose a disaggregate 
analysis of some Treaties and of their social clauses, focusing in a 
                                
83 See D. AUGENSTEIN et al., Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the 
Environment applicable to European Enterprises operating outside the European Union, Study 
for the European Commission, ENTR/09/045 (2010).  
84 Communication of the Commission “Towards a Comprehensive European International 
Investment Policy, COM (2010) 343 final. 
85 EU Council, Council conclusion on child labour, http:www.concilium.europa.eu/ 
eudocs/cms_Data_docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/115180.pdf. 
86 See G. Gorska, Mutual Influence: The Case of the EU and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, in European Yearbook on Human Rights, 2012, p. 109 ss. 
87 D. AUGENSTEIN and C. BEHRMANN, Partnering with Civil Society: The EU’s Approach to 
Promoting Human Rights and Decent Work in Bangladesh, in European Yearbook on Human 
Rights, 2012, p. 97 ss. 
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transversal way around two essential points of the comprehension of the 
matter: 1) Commitments; 2) enforcement and effectiveness. 
This way to proceed leads to more fruitful outcomes, compared to the 
single analysis of the treaties, as it permits to compare the different social 
clauses, in order to verify differences and similarities and to create some 
“models” of social clause; it will be useful, again, to identify pros and cons 
of each model and thus identify the more advanced model, or, at least on 
paper, the more effective social clause. In the analysis I will consider some 
bilateral treaties (like CETA, EPA, EU-Korea, US-Jordan) and some 
multilateral treaties (GATT-WTO, Mercosur, NAALC, CPTTP and CAFTA-DR) 
and also the unilateral system of trade tariff preferences (EU-GSP and US-
GSP), as they can be considered “a milder approach to the social clause”88.  
This work is useful to identify the different “logic for action” which 
guided the Parties during the negotiations of social clauses and thus 
permits to answer, for each “model” to a list of questions:  
i) Will the economic-mercantilist logics prevail, or the axiological ones, 
or a mix of those? What is the degree of social conditionality?  
ii) Is there a difference on the logics between social clauses in the 
agreements with developing Countries and those among peer economies?  
iii) Is there any difference between the US and the EU’s approach on 
negotiations?  
iv) Has the insertion of the social clause in the paradigm of sustainable 
development, which represent the last evolution of the social clause, really 
entailed some advantages in terms of social rights (or not?)  
9.1. Commitments. 
The first step concerning the disaggregate analysis is about the 
commitments. First of all, we must verify i) the allocation of the 
commitments in social matter in the general economy of the Treaty, ii) the 
literal formulas employed, iii) the content of the commitments. 
9.1.1. Allocation of Commitments. 
Since the signing of the North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation (NAALC), the first example of social clause adopted in the 
context of the multilateral agreement of free trade among the USA, Canada 
and Mexico (NAFTA), numerous regional or bilateral trade treaties have 
                                
88 See A. Perulli, Fundamental social rights. Market regulation and EU external action, in Int. 
Journal of comparative Labour Law, 2014, p. 27 ss.; F. Pantano, R. Salomone, Trade and 
Labour within the European Union. Genaralized system of preference, J. Monnet work, papers 
(New York Univ.School of Law), 2008; L. Compa, J. Vogt, Labour rights in the generalized 
system of preferences: a 20 Year Review, 22, Lab and Policy Journal 199, (2000-2001), p. 
206.   
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included provisions relative to labour, but the introduction of such 
provisions takes various forms and covers different aspects of social 
practice and labour laws. 
Before starting with the analysis of the content of such provisions, we 
need to reflect on the possibly different “allocation” of those provisions, as, 
in addition to simply being mentioned in the preamble, they may be 
covered in a separate section, that is to say in an agreement annexed to 
the treaty (as it is the case of NAALC, which is commonly called “Labour 
side agreement), or those provisions can be part of a specific chapter of 
the agreement.  
In this regard, the US-Jordan (2001) was the first US agreement which 
introduced a special section on labour, becoming a benchmark for all 
subsequent agreements (Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, CAFTA, 
Bahrain, Oman and Peru, etc.). The provision for a whole chapter of the 
agreement devoted to labour, integrating a clause on social issues in the 
body of the text, rather than in an annexed agreement, is the first step 
forward for the recognition of workers’ social rights, in order to realize a 
true integration of labour concerns into the trade agreement: it is not thus 
a simple attachment to the treaty but a list of principles which is full part 
of the treaty, like any commercial provisions.  
After this milestone, all the agreements have a specific chapter which 
regards Labour (CAFTA-DR Chapter 16 “Labour”; CPTTP Chapter 19 
“Labour”) or, as it is more common from the EU side, are inserted all labour 
provisions in a chapter entitled “Trade and Labour” (CETA) or, more 
broadly, “Trade and Sustainable Development” (as for Korea-EU FTA and 
EPA).  
9.1.2. Literal meaning of commitments. 
Looking at the several agreements, is it possible to observe a lot of 
differences concerning the language used for social clauses, which 
determines a great variation of the juridical and social effects of the 
commitments undertaken.  
Often, the parties express their central obligations not in a binding 
way, but using an aspirational language, using verbs in their conditional 
form, or referring, in a “soft” way, to the promotion of compliance: ex. 
NAALC, art. 1: The objectives of this Agreement are to: (f) promote 
compliance with, and effective enforcement by each Party of its labour 
law; Us-Jordan, art. 6: “The Parties shall strive to ensure that such labour 
principles and the internationally recognized labour rights are recognized 
and protected by domestic law”; CAFTA-DR, art. 16.1.1. “Each Parties shall 
strive to ensure that such labour principle and the internationally 
recognized labour rights are recognized and protected by the law” or art. 
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16.2 “A party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labour law…”; Art. 19.4 
CPTTP: “No party shall waive or derogate from its statutes and 
regulations”; Art. 13.3 Korea-EU “(…) each Party shall seek to ensure that 
those law and policies provide for and encourage high levels of labour 
protection (…).  
In this sense, we are not able to see a step forward in the last mega-
treaties because the formula used (Art. 23.3.4 CETA “The Parties shall 
make continued and sustained effort to ratify the fundamental ILO 
Conventions if they have not yet done so”) is not more binding (even if 
enforced in a more binding way, as we will see). We can find an approach 
that is still exhortative, but with a greater level of commitment, at least on 
paper, in the second generation USA FTAs, like for instance in the US-PERU 
FTA, where (Art. 17.1: Statement of Shared Commitments), after stating 
that The Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), it is provided that “Each Party shall adopt and 
maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder, the 
following rights, as stated in the ILO Declaration”. 
Those literal formulas lead to consider the social clause as a 
promotional tool where the commitments are often built with a regulative 
technique using aspirational formulas that are little binding, if not mere 
declarations of intentions; this weakness in the formulation of obligations 
does not certainly tend to a social conditionality in a strong sense. 
9.1.3. Content of commitments. 
In the last two decades, labour provisions in bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements have been widened and deepened. Over 80 per cent of 
agreements that have come into force since 2013 contain such 
provisions89, in order to commit the parties not to lower their labour 
standards or derogate from labour law with a view to boosting 
competitiveness.  
Social clauses have not only grown in number as to become a common 
trait of these trade agreements but have acquired great substantive and 
procedural complexity90, as they are included in different ways in FTAs.  
Even if no standard model can be identified when we review these 
agreements, we must point out which are the most commonly included 
provisions, starting from the main distinction between those agreements 
which, as NAALC, state the commitment for each party to enforce its 
                                
89 ILO, Studies on Growth with Equity, Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade and 
Investment Arrangements, Report July 2016.  
90 T. Treu, Globalization and Human Rights: Social Clauses in Trade Agreements and in 
International Exchanges among Companies, in A. Perulli, T. Treu (eds), Sustainable 
Development, Global Trade and Social Rights, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 99.  
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domestic labour law (a), on the other agreements which include also some 
reference to the international dimension of social rights (b) (in different 
ways, as we will see).  
9.1.3.1 No harmonization.  
In most free trade agreement the Parties declare that they do not 
intend to harmonise the labour standards.  
This is explicitly declared in NAALC, ANNEX 1 LABOUR PRINCIPLES: 
“The following are guiding principles that the Parties are committed to 
promote, subject to each Party's domestic law, but do not establish 
common minimum standards for their domestic law.”, but also in the most 
recent FTA: “the agreement is not to harmonise the environment or labour 
standards of the Parties (EPA, Art. 16.1, par. 2) or “The Parties recognise 
that it is not their intention in this Chapter to harmonise the labour or 
environment standards of the Parties” (EU-Korea, Article 13.1 3). This type 
of social clause, differently to what happened within the experience of 
European integration (as well as in the normative tradition of international 
labour law), does not provide for the compliance with uniform supra-
national minimum standards, but rather the guarantee of effectiveness of 
the single national standards. 
Differently from this explicit negation of harmonization, MERCORSUR, 
through the 1998 Social Labour Declaration, states in the Preamble the 
objective to set a minimum floor of workers right. We could call this 
commitment as a “soft” or “small” harmonization, at least referring to the 
core, minimum, social standards: “Whereas the Ministers of Labour of 
MERCOSUR have stated in their meetings that regional integration cannot 
be confined to the commercial and economic spheres, and must also 
incorporate social issues, as regards the adaptation of the regulatory 
frameworks for labour to the new circumstances resulting from integration 
and the process of economic globalization, as well as the recognition of a 
minimum floor of workers' rights within MERCOSUR, in line with the 
fundamental ILO Conventions” (Preamble, MERCOSUR). 
Even if the Preamble also states that “Whereas the States parties, as 
well as being Members of the International Labour Organization (ILO), have 
ratified the principal Conventions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of 
workers” at the time of writing Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay had 
already ratified all the ILO Conventions, while Brazil was missing a core 
convention (C087 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87). In this sense, the construction of a 
minimum floor of rights could not be referred only to the ILO core labour 
standards, but, more generally to some common labour standards, “in line 
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with” ILO Conventions and in this case the Mercosur could be considered 
as a pioneer in promoting the social rights in the economic relationship.  
9.1.3.2. Commitments to respect its own labour law.  
When we are thinking about a treaty which aims to commit Parties to 
respect their own labour law, it is logic to refer to the NAALC Model, as it 
was the first example of FTA to adopt such measure.  
The art. 3 of NAALC testifies the intention of the parties, who promote 
the “compliance with and effectively enforce its labour law through 
appropriate government action (…)”. Therefore, there is no aim of 
harmonization or, even more, of standardization of the levels of protection 
in social matters, that is left to the national legislator’s discretion.  
This provision to respect its own domestic labour law guarantees the 
maximum valorization of the sovereignty of the nation-State about the 
levels of national protections on social matters and this model seems to be 
expanded, nowadays.  
As a matter of fact, the formula has been adopted in the recent CPTTP: 
“Article 19.5: Enforcement of Labour Laws 1. No Party shall fail to 
effectively enforce its labour laws”, but also in the CETA Article 23.2 (Right 
to regulate and levels of protection), states that “Recognising the right of 
each Party to set its labour priorities, to establish its levels of labour 
protection and to adopt or modify its laws and policies accordingly in a 
manner consistent with its international labour commitments, including 
those in this Chapter, each Party shall seek to ensure those laws and 
policies provide for and encourage high levels of labour protection and shall 
strive to continue to improve such laws and policies with the goal of 
providing high levels of labour protection”. Similarly, in EPA, Article 16.2, 
using more or less the same words, (Right to regulate and levels of 
protection), indicates that “1. Recognising the right of each Party to 
determine its sustainable development policies and priorities, to establish 
its own levels of domestic environmental and labour protection, and to 
adopt or modify accordingly its relevant laws and regulations, consistently 
with its commitments to the internationally recognised standards and 
international agreements to which the Party is party, each Party shall strive 
to ensure that its laws, regulations and related policies provide high levels 
of environmental and labour protection and shall strive to continue to 
improve those laws and regulations and their underlying levels of 
protection”.  
This provision, as stated in NAALC, EPA and CETA, leads to some 
interpretation problems: how will it be possible to deal with the 
commitment to enforce its national labour laws, with the ideal objective of 
the social clause to create uniform standards, in a way to guarantee a level 
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playing filed, and, from a point of view of values and labour, the respect of 
international recognized labour standards?  
Will we face the risk that, in such way, the logic of comparative 
advantages of the different domestic levels of regulations, on which the 
Singapore Declaration (“We reject the use of labour standards for 
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of 
Countries, particularly low-wage developing Countries, must in no way be 
put into question”) was focused? This concern could be by-passed 
considering that parties “shall strive to continue to improve those laws and 
regulations and their underlying levels of protection” (as it was foreseen in 
the NAALC, as in EPA and CETA there is a double commitment: that of 
enforcement of the domestic law and that of continuing to improve those 
laws).  
A further profile of critic analysis regarding the respect of the internal 
legislation in matter of labour concerns the prohibition of encouraging trade 
or investments through the souplesse of the respective domestic 
regulations. This leads to the following question: 
if parties should undertake to respect their labour law without any 
exception, is this obligation “absolute”, or is it limited to the behaviours 
that are capable to conditionate the trade relationships?  
Just to mention an example, the EPA provides for commitments like 
the prohibition of relaxing domestic labour laws to attract trade and 
investment (“The Parties shall not encourage trade or investment by 
relaxing or lowering the level of protection provided by their respective 
environmental or labour laws and regulations. To that effect, the Parties 
shall not waive or otherwise derogate from those laws and regulations or 
fail to effectively enforce them through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or investment between the 
Parties”, art.16.2, par. 2), and of discrimination or restrictions to trade’s 
purpose: (“The Parties shall not use their respective environmental or 
labour laws and regulations in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against the other Party, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade”, art. 16.2, par. 3).  This clause 
is present also in CAFTA (art. 16.2), and in some FTAs, with reference to 
the internal legislation and to the related compliance with the rights as 
stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
and its Follow-Up (1998): for example, the US-Peru FTA states that 
“Neither Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, its statutes or regulations implementing 
paragraph 1 in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties, 
where the waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with a fundamental 
right set out in that paragraph”.  
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How should we interpret this clause?  
Two explanations could be possible.  
1) According to the first interpretation, the clause confirms the 
existence of a minimum floor of rights which cannot be modified to attract 
investors or in order to facilitate trade: therefore, a floor of rights that is 
inconditioned and non negotiable for trade/financial purposes. This 
interpretation would be coherent with the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social 
Justice for a Fair Globalization, according to which “the violation of 
fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked or otherwise 
used as a legitimate comparative advantage and that labour standards 
should not be used for protectionist trade purposes”. This interpretation is 
closer to the axiological logic rather than the trade one, from which, on the 
contrary, it seems to free itself, in order to go towards an ideal of a trade 
that is fair and inconditionally respectful of fundamental social rights.  
2) The second interpretation is more problematic, because it seems to 
establish a linkage between the reduction of levels of protection and the 
encouragement of trade or investments. This interpretation is more 
coherent with the trade logic of social clause, in the sense that, in order to 
contrast the possible violation, the Country must demonstrate that the 
commercial partner has adopted those behaviours (that is the reduction of 
the levels of protections) to encourage trade or investments and thus it 
must give the proof. This should be a very serious concern because it is 
not easy at all to demonstrate a direct relation between the deregulation 
of labour standards and the objective to encourage trade and 
investments91. This is why, in my opinion, this is a very dangerous 
statement, and it should be overcome enshrining the absolute obligation 
to respect the domestic law, and not to derogate from it, but, on the 
contrary, to raise the level of social rights protection, as provided in the 
NAALC, according to which “each Party (…) shall continue to strive to 
improve those standards”.  
Another concern related to the commitment of the domestic labour law 
regards the variety of normative references to the internal legislation. 
Reading the CTPPT, the parties decide to give a definition of labour law, 
which could be intended to limit the field of labour law which has to be 
promoted and respected. According to art. 19.1, “labour law means 
statutes and regulations, or provisions of statutes and regulations, of a 
Party that are directly related to the following internationally recognised 
labour rights: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of 
the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced 
                                
91 See F. Ebert, The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Are Existing 
Arrangements Sufficient to Prevent Adverse Effects on Labour Standard?,  
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or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour, a 
prohibition on the worst forms of child labour and other labour protections 
for children and minors; (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with 
respect to minimum wage, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health”. Certainly wider is the reference to the internal legislation supplied 
by the NAALC with its 11 Labour principles that the parties commit to 
comply with; an omni-comprehensive list that includes also the right to 
strike, while no reference is made in the field of dismissal.  
The matter raised by these Treaties is therefore the field of social 
conditionality, that varies in an extremely sensitive way by reason of the 
field of application of internal legislations recalled by each single Treaty. 
We may not say that the global scenario is intended to a rational 
identification of the object of the clauses, while it should be hoped that a 
research for a more homogeneous finalization of the assumed 
commitments, in order to build an organic network of rules about labour 
on a global scale were done.  
9.1.3.3. Commitments to respect international labour law.  
With reference to the commitments to respect international labour 
standards, which, of course, are usually added to the (possible) previous 
commitment to respect its own domestic labour law, we need to distinguish 
different types of standards mentioned, and a different degree of 
commitment for the signatories Parties.  
 
i) “Internationally recognized labour rights”  
Some agreements generally refer to “internationally recognized labour 
rights” without referring to the ILO Core Labour Standards, but sometimes 
spreading the content of the commitments undertaken, compared to those 
promoted by the ILO Core Conventions.  
The first example of this model is the NAALC.  
This agreement, which precedes the 1998 Declaration on fundamental 
principles and rights, makes no explicit reference to the ILO's conventions 
but, as prof. Bellace observed, the NAALC labour principles include the four 
principles in the Declaration, and more. NAALC refers to eleven principles 
(Article 49) which go further than the eight fundamental conventions that 
the nations must strive to achieve. According to the NAALC Annex 1 defines 
“labour principles” as “guiding values” that the parties commit to respect 
and it individuates them in the following thematic fields: 1) freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining; 2) right to collective 
bargaining; 3) right to strike; 4) prohibition of forced labour; 5) protection 
of child and minor labour; 6) protection of minimum standards of 
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employment (for example: minimum wages and benefits for extra-hour 
labour); 7) elimination of discrimination on labour; 8) right to equal salary 
among men and women working in the same enterprise and having the 
same task; 9) prevention of professional illnesses and injuries on labour; 
10) right to compensation in case of illnesses and injuries on labour; 11) 
protection of migrant workers.  
Despite the content of the commitment is broader than that of the ILO 
Conventions, it is important to point out that such Principles, expressed in 
a quite vague and succinct formula, do not set common minimum 
standards at all, but only wide areas of interest (“broad areas of concern”) 
on which the parties have developed (each its own way) “laws, regulations, 
procedures and practices” intended to the “protection of the interests of 
the respective labour forces” and, furtherly, there is no mention of the 
relative Conventions of the ILO.  
In the case of US-Jordan, despite the commitment to respect the ILO 
1998 Declaration, the parties talk about some internationally recognized 
labour rights but the list does not strictly correspond to the list of the core 
labour rights: the list is wider, mentioning among the “internationally 
recognized labour rights, that of “(e) acceptable conditions of work with 
respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health”.  (Us-Jordan, Article 6, Labour 1. The Parties reaffirm their 
obligations as members of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”) 
and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. The Parties shall strive to 
ensure that such labour principles and the following internationally 
recognized labour rights (a) the right of association; (b) the right to 
organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on the use of any form 
of forced or compulsory labour; (d) a minimum age for the employment of 
children; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health) are recognized 
and protected by domestic law).  
A similar commitment can be found in the recent CTPPT (2018):  if the 
article 19.4 states that “it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in each 
Party’s labour laws”, art. 19.1, as already said, gives a definition of labour 
law, which recalls, in an identical formula to that of the US-Jordan 
agreement, which is included also in the CAFTA-DR (art. 16.8), 
demonstrating the success of this model.  
Despite the broader commitment compared to the ILO Declaration, this 
is a critical point of the agreement, mainly for CTPPT, because (as prof. 
Bellace observed in her relation) it is impossible to identify definitions of 
these rights on which the 11 signatory nations agreed (while it could be 
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simpler for 2 Countries as in the case of the US-Jordan agreement). This 
is a limit which regards all multilateral negotiations as the Countries 
involved could be very distant in terms of social policy and labour 
provisions, and thus, the more the Country are involved, the less the 
predictability of each Party is real commitment.  
 
ii) reference to the ILO 1998 Declaration 
Other agreements generally refer to the ILO 1998 Declaration but do 
not mention the ILO Core Conventions (as CPTTP, where the members 
Parties have not ratified all the Core Conventions yet, or the Us-Jordan for 
example).  
 CAFTA-DR for example, in the art. 16.1 states that “the Parties 
reaffirm their obligations as members of the ILO and their commitments 
under the ILO Declaration”.  
The 1998 Declaration commits Member States, in accordance with the 
obligations deriving from membership of the ILO, to respect and promote 
principles and rights in four categories, whether or not they have ratified 
the relevant Conventions. These categories are: freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour and 
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
The problem is that ILO Core Conventions’ content is very detailed 
compared to the principles of the ILO Declarations, and because the ILO’s 
organs of control guarantee interpretative uniformities of the rights 
sanctioned in the Conventions, differently to what happens with the 1998 
Declaration, which is not submitted to any technical supervision.  
 
iii) reference to the ILO Core Conventions 
Other Treaties, again, refer specifically to the ILO Core Conventions, 
as it is usual for FTAs signed by EU. This is the case of EPA EU-Japan, at 
art. 16.3, with a formula that is, however, little biding: “Each Party shall 
make continued and sustained efforts on its own initiative to pursue 
ratification of the fundamental ILO Conventions and other ILO Conventions 
which each Party considers appropriate to ratify”. The formula is a little 
vague, because as far as the commitment is concerned, the usual 
aspirational approach (“shall make efforts”) prevails, both with reference 
to core Conventions and with reference to other Conventions, leaving the 
parties free to identify those they believe it should be “appropriate” to 
ratify. This approach to fundamental Conventions, even though it is vague, 
does not even recur in the Treaties signed by the US (as NAALC and US-
Jordan which does not contain any reference to the ILO’s Conventions). It 
is evident that the reference to the ILO Core Conventions should, on the 
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other hand, be considered as a real commitment, given that the ILO 
requires their compliance by reason of the mere bond of affiliation. Besides, 
the ILO regularly examines the application of standards, thanks both to the 
examination of periodic reports submitted by Member States on the 
measures they have taken to implement the provisions of the ratified 
Conventions and to a representations procedure and a complaints 
procedure of general application, together with a special procedure for 
freedom of association. So the reference to the ILO Conventions is at the 
moment the only way to assure a control on the respect of the 
commitments undertaken.  
In most cases, Parties commit themselves to respect the ILO 
Conventions ratified, and to ratify those that at the moment of the 
signature of the treaty are not yet ratified. An example is the Korea-EU 
FTA: Article 13.4 Multilateral labour standards and agreements (…) 3. The 
Parties reaffirm the commitment to effectively implementing the ILO 
Conventions that Korea and the Member States of the European Union have 
ratified respectively.  The Parties will make continued and sustained efforts 
towards ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the other 
Conventions that are classified as ‘up-to-date’ by the ILO.” (at the time of 
writing Korea has ratified 4/8 ILO Core Conventions)92.  
This obligation, to ratify the Core Conventions not yet ratified at the 
moment of the signature of the agreement, is also present in the EU-
Vietnam agreement (art. 3), and, as we have pointed out, in the EPA (art. 
16.3.3: “Each Party shall make continued and sustained efforts on its own 
initiative to pursue ratification of the fundamental ILO Conventions and 
other ILO Conventions which each Party considers appropriate to ratify”).  
This commitment towards a ratification of non-ratified fundamental 
ILO Conventions (even if the ratification should be on Japan’s initiative), 
demonstrates the pressure given by the EU for a social conditionality, even 
if we are not in the case of pre-ratification conditionality, as it is the case, 
for example, of the EU-SPG.  
Despite this lack of pre-ratification conditionality, we can observe that 
this commitment has led to a progress ratification of ILO Conventions by 
some Countries.  
                                
92 Conventions ratified by Korea: 1) C100 - Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 
(No. 100); C111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); 
C138 - Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)Minimum age specified: 15 years; C182 - 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). Conventions not ratified: C029 - 
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); C087 - Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); C098 - Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) and C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 
1957 (No. 105).  
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I am referring, in particular, to Canada: at the time of CETA’s 
signature, Canada had not ratified all the ILO Core Conventions: C-138 has 
been ratified in June 2016, and C-98 in June 2017. But we need to observe 
that Canada ratified 9 ILO Conventions in the last 12 months, so we can 
easily state that this Treaty has been for Canada a great incentive to ratify 
the ILO Core Conventions, while all Eu Member States93 had already ratified 
all the Core Conventions94. 
This could be a path also for Japan, in the context of EPA: we may 
observe that the time of writing Japan did not ratified two Core 
Conventions: C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 
(No. 105) and C-111 - Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958.  If, with regards to the latest Convention (C111), the lack 
of ratification is probably due to a cultural tradition, the Core Convention of 
Forced Labour has not probably been ratified yet, because Japan is currently 
under observation by the CEARC, the ILO Committee of experts about the 
other Conventions concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ratified by 
Japan in 1939): C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). The matter 
regards the compensation to some victims of wartime sexual slavery or 
                                
93 Eu28: Austria, Italy, Belgium, Latvia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Croatia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, 
Malta, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Estonia, Portugal, Finland, Romania, 
France, Slovakia, Germany, Slovenia, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Sweden, Ireland, United 
Kingdom.  
94 This is the list of Countries which did not ratified at the time of writing the ILO Core Labour 
Conventions: C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930: Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, 
China, Korea, Republic of, Marshall Islands, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States; C087 - 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948: 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, China, Cook Islands, Guinea – Bissau, India, 
Iran, Islamic Republic of, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Republic of Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Palau, Qatar, 
Saudi, Arabia, Singapore, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Arab 
Emirates, United States, Viet Nam; C098 - Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, China, Cook Islands, India, Iran, 
Islamic Republic of, Korea, Republic of, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, 
Mexico, Myanmar, Oman, Palau, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Arab 
Emirates, United States, Viet Nam; C100 - Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951: Bahrain, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cook Islands, Kuwait, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Oman, Palau, 
Qatar, Somalia, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States; C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 
1957: Brunei Darussalam, China, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Palau, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Viet Nam; C-111 - 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958: Brunei Darussalam, Cook 
Islands, Japan, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Oman, Palau, Singapore, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
United States; C-138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973; Australia, Bangladesh, Cook Islands, 
Iran, Islamic Republic of Liberia, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, New Zealand, Palau, Saint Lucia, 
Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States, Vanuatu; C182 - Worst Forms of Child 
Labour Convention, 1999: Cook Islands, Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu.  
THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 75 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 146/2018 
industrial forced labour during the Second World War95. The Committee refers 
in particular to a decision of the Korean Supreme Court of Justice passed 
on 24th May 2012 which reversed the decisions of lower courts rejecting 
the demands for compensation by forced labour victims against 
two leading Japanese industries. Moreover, about the same ILO 
Conventions, there is a CEACR Request (on the same ILC session of 2016), 
related to the trafficking in humans, in particular about the low number of 
prison sentences imposed on perpetrators, to the fact that no perpetrators 
of forced labour have been brought to justice, to the decline in victim 
identification and to the insufficient support granted to victims96.  
We therefore expect clear progress from Japan towards ratifying the 
two remaining ILO core conventions (on discrimination and on the abolition 
of forced labour), considering that, above all, Japan is the second largest 
contributor to the ILO’s regular budget97. 
A peculiar case is that of CAFTA-DR, which, in addition to a mention to 
the ILO 1998 Declaration, refers explicitly only to one single core ILO 
Convention: ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
(1999) (ILO Convention 182). Art. 16.5, focused on “Labour Cooperation 
and Capacity Building Mechanism” states that: 1 1. Recognizing that 
cooperation on labour issues can play an important role in advancing 
development in the territory of the Parties and in providing opportunities 
to improve labour standards, and to further advance common 
commitments regarding labour matters, including the principles embodied 
in the ILO Declaration and ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labour (1999) (ILO Convention 182), the Parties hereby establish a 
Labour Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism, as set out in Annex 
16.5.  
This commitment undertaken by the signatory parties could be 
suggested as a model to follow because in this way, choosing one or more 
conventions to be respected, the binding of the commitments is assured.  
Finally, we need to observe that the agreements do not contain any 
reference to the interpretation given by the ILO about the content of the 
Core Conventions, so the question whether the right to strike follows from 
                                
95 Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016) - Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Victims of wartime sexual slavery or industrial forced labour.  
96 Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016), Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29) - (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13201::: 
NO:13201:P13201_COUNTRY_ID:102729.  
97 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---exrel/documents/publication/ 
wcms_357443.pdf.  
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or not the Convention n. 87 on freedom of association and right to organize 
is not clear, as prof. Bellace underlined in her paper.  
9.1.3.4. Pre-ratification conditionality.  
In some cases, the social conditionality is more rigorous and it 
subordinates the signature of the trade agreement to the ratification of the 
Conventions (the so-called “pre-ratification conditionality”). This is the 
model adopted by the EU Generalized System of Preferences98, a regulation 
model which intended to combine trade liberalization and respect of social 
rights through the preferential and non-mutual treatment granted to 
developing Countries in the field of trade exchanges, notwithstanding the 
GATT normative 99.  
According to the special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance (as stated by. Art. 9 of the Reg. 
978/2012) a GSP beneficiary Country may benefit from the tariff 
preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for 
sustainable development and good governance if “it has ratified all 
“relevant conventions” and the most recent available conclusions of the 
monitoring bodies under those conventions do not identify a serious failure 
to effectively implement any of those conventions.  
The relevant conventions are the core international conventions on 
human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. 
In terms of social rights, Parties are committed to ratify and implement a 
list of Core human and labour rights UN / ILO Conventions, and thus, 
indeed, all the ILO Core Conventions100.  
                                
98 F. PANTANO, R. SALOMONE, Trade and Labour within the European Union Generalized System 
of Preferences, Jean Monnet WPS, New York University School of Law, 2008. 
99 See T.M. FRANCK, Fairness in International Law and Institution, Oxford, 1995, p. 58.; L. 
BARTELS, C. HABERLI, Binding Tariff Preferences For Developing Countries Under Article II 
GATT, in Journal of International Economic Law. 
100 Annex VIII of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of 31 October 20121, The relevant GSP+ 
conventions, Core human and labour rights UN/ILO Conventions: 1. Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 2. International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) 3. International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966) 4. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966) 5. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 
6. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984) 7. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 8. Convention concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labour, No 29 (1930) 9. Convention concerning Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise, No 87 (1948) 10. Convention concerning the 
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, No 98 (1949) 
11. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration of Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal 
Value, No 100 (1951) 12. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, No 105 
(1957) 13. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 
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In this sense the EU GSP could be considered as an exemplar model of 
positive linkage between international trade and social rights in the 
European external action101: any of the GSP arrangements may be 
temporarily withdrawn for serious and systematic violations of core 
principles laid down in core human and labour rights conventions and on a 
number of other grounds such as unfair trading practices and serious 
shortcomings in customs controls.  
9.1.3.5. The reference to the Decent Work and to Sustainable 
Development 
The last FTA signed by EU (CETA and EU-Korea) extends their 
commitment to the decent work and sustainable development.  
In the EU-Korea for example all labour provisions are inserted in 
Chapter 13, “Trade and Sustainable Development”, where art. 13.1 states 
the intentions of the Parties “to strengthen their trade relations and 
cooperation in ways that promote sustainable development” and (art. 
13.6), the Parties recognise “the beneficial role that core labour standards 
and decent work can have on economic efficiency, innovation and 
productivity, and they highlight the value of greater policy coherence 
between trade policies, on the one hand, and employment and labour 
policies on the other”. 
In CETA, Article 22.3, par. 2 entitled “Cooperation and promotion of 
trade supporting sustainable development” – the Parties “affirm that trade 
should promote sustainable development. Accordingly, each Party shall 
strive to promote trade and economic flows and practices that contribute 
to enhancing decent work (…)”. In the following article (CETA 23.3.2), we 
observe the commitment to “ensure that its labour law and practices 
promote the following objectives included in the ILO Decent Work Agenda, 
and in accordance with the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization of 2008 adopted by the International Labour Conference at 
its 97th Session, and other international commitments: (a) health and 
safety at work, including the prevention of occupational injury or illness 
and compensation in cases of such injury or illness; (b) establishment of 
acceptable minimum employment standards for wage earners, including 
those not covered by a collective agreement; and, (c) non-discrimination 
in respect of working conditions, including for migrant workers”.  
                                
No 111 (1958) 14. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, No 
138 (1973) 15. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, No 182 (1999).  
101 Perulli A., Clausola Sociale, Enciclopedia del Diritto, Giuffré, 2014, vol. VII, pp. 187-211.  
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As we will point out, (see infra), the reference to Decent Work and to 
the pardigm of sustainable development can represent a wider and new 
horizon for social clauses. Reluctant trade partners might also be more 
willing to accept a sustainable development chapter than a separate 
chapter on social rights, as Sustainable Development is a principle 
universally accepted102 and proclaimed by the UN, through the Sustainable 
Development Goals, and by the European Commission in all the latest 
Comminications related to the European external action to harness 
globalisation103.  
Moreover, the framing of core labour rights as part of a broader 
“sustainable development” agenda has contributed to their unobjectable 
status104.   
The questions of sustainability in those FTAs serves the goals of 
protection and promotion of human rights and certainly possesses model 
character for other, future, free trade agreements and of course can be 
considered as a new basis of legitimation for a new era of social and 
enforceable clauses.  
Indeed, the majority of agreements that include such provisions are 
too recent to be able to stand back and assess them adequately.  
9.2. Carrot and stick: sanctions and incentives. 
Whichever model of social clause may be taken into consideration, we 
may reaffirm that a merely voulountaristic, or founded on moral suasion 
choice, would not be in line with the standards of the procedures of social 
conditionality within both European and North-American traditions. After a 
reasonable period of time of useless activation of the soft implementation 
mechanisms above mentioned (ministerial consultations, 
recommendations of the experts committee, realization of consultative 
public forums, and so on), the non-compliance with labour standards 
should lead to financial or commercial sanctions, following the procedure 
of dispute resolution. For example, interruption of benefits (on the NAALC 
model), and/or Monetary Enforcement Assessment (on the model of some 
FTAs and of generalized preference systems). At the same time, this kind 
                                
102 Van Den Putte L., Orbie J., EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour 
Provisions, in International Journal of Comparative Labour Law, 31, n. 3 (2015), p. 282.  
103 WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE; Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 
2025; European Commission COM(2017)2025 of 1 March 2017; Brussels, 13.9.2017 
COM(2017) 492 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to Harness 
Globalisation.  
104 Van Den Putte L., Orbie J., EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of Labour 
Provisions, in International Journal of Comparative Labour Law, 31, n. 3 (2015), p. 264.  
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of penalties should particularly regard those sectors in which the problems 
about compliance with the obligations specified on the chapter on 
Sustainability appear repeatedly, in spite of the technical/administrative 
support of the experts committee and international organizations like ILO, 
with whom we hope for a strict collabouration.  
The contemplation of sanctionatory mechanisms as a last resort does 
not exclude, and actually presupposes the coexistence of other compliance 
instruments: the cooperation and the technical support with multilateral 
agencies, notably the ILO. However, the TTIP should contemplate also 
some mechanisms founded on a promotional philosophy, under the shape 
of positive sanctions and “incentives”, like those who characterize in 
particular the GSP European Model. 
9.2.1. A verification of the enforcement. The NAALC, CAFTA, EU-
GSP cases. 
In terms of implementation, contrary to the US approach, the EU 
adopts a more nuanced approach, with a preference for dialogue and 
capacity instead of the previsions of sanctions: if it is true that, both for 
CETA and EPA (as for the TTIP), labour provisions have been widened and 
deepened compared to the past, we need to observe that they are mostly 
cooperative and non-binding provisions. As we saw, most EU FTAs use an 
aspirational language, and for this reason labour provisions risk to lack an 
effective remedy to labour violations or a valid deterrent. This is, 
unfortunately, in line with the EU traditional policies.   
As a matter of fact, the only agreement where economic and clear 
sanctions are imposed, is the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
as any of the GSP arrangements may be temporarily withdrawn for serious 
and systematic violations of core principles laid down in core human and 
labour rights conventions and on a number of other grounds such as unfair 
trading practices and serious shortcomings in customs controls.  
This “stick and carrot” conditionality of the EU’s GSP constitutes the 
“flagship” of trade initiatives aimed at supporting sustainable development 
and human right.  
In particular, if we consider the special incentive arrangement for 
Sustainable Development and Good Governance GSP+ granting full 
removal of tariffs for vulnerable low and lower-middle income Countries, 
its benefits may be temporarily withdrawn if the national legislation of a 
GSP+ beneficiary Country no longer incorporates the relevant conventions 
or if that legislation is not effectively implemented - in other words if the 
underlying balance in GSP+ between additional trade preferences in the 
EU market and beneficiaries' acceptance and implementation of 
international sustainable development and good governance rules and 
80 ADALBERTO PERULLI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 147/2018 
standards is no longer properly respected. In this regard, the Commission 
monitors the situation in beneficiary Countries on an on-going basis 
primarily by drawing on material available from the relevant inter-national 
monitoring bodies.  
The problem is double: this regulation is only for developing Countries 
and , as other scholars observed, the temporary withdrawal more or less 
has remained “to be law in the books”.  
Even in the case where sanctions for violations of the commitments in 
the field of labour law are clear and stated, the EU appears reluctant to 
apply trade sanctions for violation of labour rights: since 1995 the EU GSP 
has provided that “serious and systematic violations” of labour standards 
could lead to a withdrawal of trade preferences but over the past two 
decades to date, that has only happened three times : in 1997 for 
Myanmar/Burma, on the grounds of serious and systematic violations of 
labour rights, in 2007 for Belarus, on the same grounds  and in 2010 for 
Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s benefits were temporarily withdrawn in 2010 due to 
non effective implementation of certain human rights conventions. Thus, 
imports from Sri Lanka benefit only from the standard GSP preferential 
treatment.  
This lack of sanctions demonstrates that the GSP has rarely been used 
for protectionism reasons, to restrict imports from developing Countries, 
be-cause numerous calls for sanctions have not been taken into 
consideration.  
For example, the only sanction to be adopted against China in 1989 
(at that time China was a GSP beneficiary) for its violent repression of the 
Tiananmen Square protests was an arms embargo; in 2008, no new 
sanctions were added after another wave of violence in Tibet. In the same 
year, Russia's attack on Georgia went unpunished.  
Before continuing the reflection, I would like to point out that this 
problem is not an only European problem.  
Moreover, if we consider the US, the field of application of NAALC’s 
sanctions is rigorously limited: they apply only if the violation of the 
agreement proves to be “trade related” and “covered by mutually 
recognized labour law” (NAALC, Art. 49).  
The NAALC requires that the NAOs (National Administrative Office in 
each of the three NAFTA Parties) provides for the receipt and review of 
submissions on labour law matters in the other two Countries. The NAALC 
further delineates the types of issues that may be considered at the various 
resolution stages of the Agreement. The framers of the Agreement 
intended that disputes be addressed and settled through dialogue and 
cooperative consultations, initially at the NAO level and later at the 
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ministerial level. At the NAO and ministerial level, there is a broad range 
of issues that may be considered for review. 
At the time of writing (August 2018), there are 39 submissions 
received under the NAALC: 3 are currently under review, 4 have been 
withdrawn by submitter, 9 are declined after review, 23 have been 
reported105.  
Considering those reported, 11 submissions were filed by the US 
(especially against Mexican industries, the majority for violations under the 
NAALC concerns  freedom of association and the right to organize, 
collective bargaining, but there were also cases concerning violations of 
occupational safety and health, minimum wage and overtime pay, access 
to fair and transparent labour tribunal proceedings and gender 
discrimination), 10 submission were filed by Mexico (most of the 
submissions concern migrant workers in the State of Washington employed 
in the apple industry and raises issues of freedom of association, safety 
and health, employment discrimination, minimum employment standards, 
protection of migrant workers, and compensation in cases of occupational 
injuries and illnesses) and 2 submission were filed by Canada (one was 
also filed with the U.S. NAO and includes the same allegations of worker 
rights violations at two different garment factories located in Mexico, and 
the other raises concerns about the enforcement of labour legislation 
covering occupational safety and health and freedom of association of 
workers at the Itapsa export processing plant in the State of Mexico).  
As for the results of this submissions, with regards to the last case 
submission reported (June 2016)106, the U.S. Department of Labour has 
issued a public report (June 2016) in response to a submission filed under 
the NAALC by the United Food & Commercial Workers Local 770, the Frente 
Auténtico del Trabajo, the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy, and 
the Project on Organizing, Development, Education, and Research, with 
research assistance from Change to Win.  The report determines that there 
is insufficient evidence, at this time, to support specific conclusions related 
to the Mexican government’s application of labour laws at Chedraui retail 
stores, in light of information in the submission and additional information 
obtained during the review. Nonetheless, the report discusses in detail the 
Department of Labour’s longstanding, serious concerns regarding issues 
raised in the submission, in particular so-called “protection contracts” and 
the primary factors that facilitate them, such as structural bias in the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Boards that administer labour justice in Mexico. 
                                
105 https://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm (here the list of cases with the 
reports).  
106 U.S. NAO Submission No. 2015-04 (UFCW).  
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The previous submission had the same result (August 2007), due to 
the lack of evidence of proof. The submission (U.S. NAO Submission No. 
2005-03, Hidalgo) was filed on October 14 by The Progressive Union of 
Workers of the Textile Industry, the Manufacturing, Cutting and Confection 
of Fabric and Garments in General and Related and Similar Industries in 
the Mexican Republic, a member of the "Vanguardia Obrera" Workers 
Federation of the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants, 
with the support of the U.S. Labour Education in the Americas Project, and 
the Washington Office on Latin America under the NAALC concerning the 
enforcement of labour laws by the Government of Mexico. The submission 
focuses on events at a textile plant operated by Rubie's de Mexico. In 
particular, the submitters allege that the Government of Mexico has failed 
to fulfill its obligations under the NAALC to effectively enforce its labour law 
under Article 3 in connection with freedom of association and protection of 
the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike, 
prohibition of forced labour, labour protections for children and young 
persons, minimum employment standards, elimination of employment 
discrimination, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, and 
compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses, and under 
Article 5 with respect to fair, equitable and transparent labour tribunal 
proceedings. 
According to Public Report of Review of Office of Trade and Labour 
Affairs (OTLA), “the submitters failed to provide sufficient evidence to 
corroborate many of their claims and failed to pursue domestic procedures 
to remedy many of the alleged violations”. That is why the report included 
only some recommendation: the OTLA recommends NAO consultations 
pursuant to Article 21 of the NAALC to discuss the following: i) Compliance 
with procedural requirements in Mexico’s labour law, and measures taken 
to prevent unwarranted delays and to improve coordination between 
federal and State authorities in the administration of labour justice 
procedures; ii) Transparency in the union representation process, including 
the establishment of a publicly available registry of unions and collective 
bargaining agreements; iii) Resources devoted to the periodic inspection 
of workplaces so that labour laws, such as those related to the protection 
of young people, minimum employment standards, and occupational safety 
and health, may be enforced effectively and consistently; iv) Clarification 
of discriminatory practices in Mexico and the current status of initiatives 
undertaken on this issue pursuant to the Ministerial Consultations 
Implementation Agreement relating to U.S. Submission 9701; and v) 
Access to Mexican authorities responsible for relevant labour law 
enforcement. Despite the strict limits of operativeness which have been 
demonstrated by these two submissions’ results, the predisposition of a 
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social clause supported by an actual sanctionatory apparatus (which goes 
well beyond “the moral pressure” and the mobilisation of shame, in which 
basically the activity of the ILO can be summarized) inside a multilateral 
agreement of free exchange constitutes an unprecedented fact.  
On one hand, this marks a clear fracture with the past experiences of 
international regulation of the economy and of trade exchanges, in 
particular with the GATT, and on the other hand, it modifies the unilateral 
approach so far dominating the USA’s trade policies, making it more 
suitable to international law principles and to the multilateral discipline of 
trade relations. 
With regards to the difficulty to apply the sanctions, we may underline 
that in all the commitments according to the commitment of the parties 
not to relax their labour law “in a manner affecting trade”, the affection to 
trade is very hard to be demonstrated.  
We must observe that this formula is very frequent: in EPA (art. 
16.2.2. “the Parties shall not waive or otherwise derogate from those laws 
and regulations or fail to effectively enforce them through a sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade or 
investment between the Parties”) but also in CAFTA-DR (art. 16.2, 
Enforcement of Labour Laws 1. (a) A Party shall not fail to effectively 
enforce its labour laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action 
or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement), in US Jordan (art. 6.4.a A Party shall 
not fail to effectively enforce its labour laws, through a sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between 
the Parties) and in CPTTP (Article 19.4: Non Derogation. The Parties 
recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in each Party’s labour laws. 
Accordingly, no Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to 
waive or otherwise derogate from, its statutes or regulations: (a) 
implementing Article 19.3.1 (Labour Rights), if the waiver or derogation 
would be inconsistent with a right set out in that paragraph; or (b) 
implementing Article 19.3.1 (Labour Rights) or Article 19.3.2 , if the waiver 
or derogation would weaken or reduce adherence to a right set out in 
Article 19.3.1, or to a condition of work referred to in Article 19.3.2, in a 
special trade or customs area, such as an export processing zone or foreign 
trade zone, in the Party’s territory, in a manner affecting trade or 
investment between the Parties”).  
The difficulties to demonstrate the Party’s intention to affect trade, that 
is to attract investors and enterprises, is clearly demonstrated by Trade 
Dispute issues ruling in US-Guatemala Labour Law Case, under the CAFTA 
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-DR, finding that Guatemala’s alleged failure to enforce domestic labour 
legislation was not done “in a manner affecting trade”.  
The Guatemala Submission under CAFTA-DR (Arbitral Panel Decision 
Reached in June 2017) was the first time a labour rights dispute had ever 
been filed under an FTA’s dispute settlement mechanism. The US formally 
launched the case in 2010, following complaints made by domestic and 
Guatemalan labour unions two years prior. Washington officials raised 
concerns that the alleged treatment of Guatemalan workers (8 employers 
were cited for their dismissal of nearly 80 workers who had attempted to 
engage in union activities) was in violation of their labour rights, while also 
putting American workers at an unfair competitive disadvantage. The 
international ruling (June 2017) prevents the United States from seeking 
penalties on Guatemala for failing to effectively enforce its labour laws, 
simply because such abuses are not “in a manner affecting trade.” Under 
CAFTA-DR, the panel decision is final; there is no appeal process. Any press 
inquiry about the case should be directed to the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. 
This decision demonstrates that it is very difficult for workers’ 
complaints to be upheld, despite the social provisions included in the FTA. 
This is why we need to think to a new legitimation of the social clause.  
9.3. Enforcement and ISDS. 
A profile of particular and current interest concerns the relationship 
between the enforcement of social clauses and arbitral clauses on the 
investments (ISDS), or ICS, and their compatibility with the principles of 
EU’s right on the external action of the Union (art. 206 and 207 TFEU, but 
also art. 9 on horizontal social clause).  
Such clauses could be undermined by the ISDS (Investor-To-State 
Dispute Settlement), a mechanism included in many trade and investment 
agreements to settle disputes.  
This clause could be invoked by transnational corporations in order to 
protect investments and to contrast all social policies considered against 
financial and economic interests107: under a free trade agreement which 
include ISDS mechanisms, a company from one signatory State investing 
in another signatory state can argue that new laws or regulations, for 
example the raising of some labour standards, could negatively affect its 
expected profits or investment potential, and seek compensation in a 
binding arbitration tribunal, rather than public courts. In this way, all the 
                                
107 Cfr. LANCE COMPA, Labour Rights and Labour Standard in Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Negotiations: An American Perspective, John Hopkins University, Working Paper 
Series, July 2014. 
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commitment taken by a Country in terms of social rights could be 
frustrated.  
In reply to the criticisms to this tool, in particular due to the lack of the 
right to appeal, the lack of transparency or the lack of independence of 
arbitrators, the EU has decided to reform the traditional arbitration-based 
system and replace it with the ICS, the Investment Court System.  
The ICS incorporates many innovative features and addresses to some 
of the core criticism, solving many problems like the lack of the right to 
appeal, the lack of transparency or the lack of independence of arbitrators, 
demonstrating a certain progress in developing a balanced and forward-
looking approach in the international investment policy108.  
The first important element is the establishment of an Investment 
Tribunal of First Instance, composed of 15 judges jointly chosen at random 
for each case, and subjected to strict ethical requirements, including a 
prohibition from acting as legal counsel in any investment dispute. The 
second important element is the creation of a permanent Appeal Tribunal, 
which will ensure the respect of rights and more importantly, the coherence 
of decisions in individual cases. 
Following the EU Commission proposal to replace the ISDS with the 
ICS in the context of the TTIP negotiations (at the moment stopped), the 
ICS has been included in the CETA109, and in the trade agreements 
concluded with Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico.  
The EU has discussed during the negotiations its reformed proposal on 
the ICS also within the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between 
                                
108 Cagnin V., New generations treaties and the attempts for a renewal of the Investor State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS), in Perulli A., Treu T., Sustainable Development, Global Trade and Social Rights, 
Kluwer, 2018, pp. 155-168.  
109 CETA moves decisively away from the traditional approach of investment dispute resolution 
and establishes independent, impartial and permanent investment Tribunals. Accordingly, the 
members of these Tribunals will be individuals qualified for judicial office in their respective 
countries, and these will be appointed by the European Union and Canada, and not arbitrators 
nominated by the investor and the defending State (as foreseen in the ISDS).  Contrary to 
the traditional investment dispute settlement approach, cases will be heard by three randomly 
selected members. Strict ethical rules for these individuals have been set to ensure their 
independence and impartiality, the absence of conflict of interest, bias or appearance of bias. 
The Tribunal will be composed of fifteen members nominated by the Union and Canada and 
not by arbitrators nominated by the investor and the defending State. The tribunal will hear 
cases in divisions of three members appointed via a randomised procedure. CETA is then the 
first agreement to include an Appeal mechanism (art. 8.28) which will allow the correction of 
errors and ensure the consistency of the decisions of the Tribunal of first instance109. Furtherly 
(art. 8.36), CETA introduces full transparency in investment dispute settlement proceedings: 
all documents (submissions by the parties, decisions of the tribunal) will be publicly available 
on a United Nations website which the EU will finance and all hearings will be open to the 
public. Interested parties (NGO's, trade unions) will be able to make submissions. This will be 
binding and cannot be waived by the tribunal or the parties to a dispute.  
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the EU and Japan, which is a well-known supporter of the ISDS110: the 
agreement is now awaiting ratification by the European Parliament and the 
Japanese Diet following which it could enter into force in 2019 but 
negotiations with Japan continue on investment protection standards and 
investment protection dispute resolution in order to reach convergence in 
the investment protection negotiations as soon as possible, in light of their 
shared commitment to a stable and secure investment environment in 
Europe and Japan. 
For the EU, ISDS in EU trade and investment agreements is a thing of 
the past: in its recent judgment of 6 March 2018 in the Achmea case, the 
ECJ confirmed the Commission's view that investor-to-State arbitration in 
an agreement concluded between Member States is not compatible with 
EU law. The ECJ ruled that these clauses do not have legal effect. 
Thus, the replacing of the ISDS with ICS is considered as a guarantee 
not to undermine EU’s and member States’ right to adopt and apply, 
accordingly to their respective competences, the measures geared to non-
discriminatorily fulfill legitimate interests of public policy, in social, 
environmental, national security, financial system stability, public health 
and security fields, as well as well as in social policies such as the raising 
of the minimum wage.  
The skepticism about ISDS is growing in various parts of the world, 
also in the US.  
This is why the renegotiations of NAFTA, including the chapter on 
investment, began. Canada, Mexico and the United States held several 
rounds of renegotiations of the treaty. Although a handful of chapters have 
been finalized (e.g. competitiveness, and customs and border facilitation), 
the investment chapter remained in flux at the time of writing. A number 
of proposals have been reported in the early part of 2018, including 
regarding the status of ISDS, since the failure by the party complained 
against to effectively enforce its occupational safety and health, child 
labour or minimum wage technical labour standards is trade-related and 
covered by mutually recognized labour laws. 
On September 6, 2017, Belgium (strong opponent to the signature of 
CETA) submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) a 
request for an opinion on the compatibility of the ICS with the European 
Treaties111.  
                                
110 In December 2017, the EU announced that the negotiations between the EU and Japan on 
the EPA had been finalized. However, for the investment chapter, some aspects remain 
subject to further negotiation 
111 https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/ceta_summary.pdf  
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Specifically, Belgium is requesting an opinion on the compatibility of 
the ICS with (1) the exclusive competence of the CJEU to provide the 
definitive interpretation of EU law, (2) the general principle of equality and 
the “practical effect” requirement of EU law, (3) the right of access to the 
courts and (4) the right to an independent and impartial judiciary. 
The doubt of the compatibility could be overcome also with regards to 
the EU external action, in the ambit of which, following the Lisbon Treaty, 
the linkage between global trade and social rights112 moves on, keeping 
the promotion of human dignity and the respect of equality and solidarity, 
which cannot be scarified by the free trade.  
Another limit to the fairness of this clause is due to the presence of the 
Horizontal social clause113 (Art. 9 TFUE), which reads: “In defining and 
implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the 
guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, 
(and a high level of education, training and protection of human health)”.   
The CJEU’s response will affect future international agreements 
negotiated by the European Union: if, according to the CJE, the ICS is not 
compatible with the EU law, in the future EU’s FTAs a more social logic (and 
less commercial) will be adopted.  
In the meantime, the best solution to avoid any negative potential 
effect of ISDS / ICS on social rights, can be found in the possibility of 
restricting treaty provisions that are subject to this arbitral resolution of 
conflict, excluding certain policy areas, such as labour law, so that those 
clauses cannot be invoked in social matters. Otherwise, all social clauses, 
and in general, all the commitments to labour, social rights and the right 
to regulation, would not have reason to be inserted into Treaties. 
10. Some concluding remarks: from free trade to fair 
trade, through a new sustainable legitimation of social 
clauses.  
The most recent European architecture marks an important stage in 
the passage from free-trade to fair-trade, in a perspective of strong re-
launch of the linkage between international trade and promotion of core 
labour standards 114. Among the innovations introduced by the Lisbon 
                                
112 A. PERULLI, Sostenibilità, diritti sociali e commercio globale: la prospettiva del Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in WP CSDLE “Massimo D'Antona”.INT - 115/2015, 10. 
113 On horizontal social clause, cfr. A. PERULLI, Fundamental Social Rights, Market Regulation 
and EU External Action, in International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, 2014, 30,1, 33-39.  
114 A. LYON-CAEN, A proposito di dumping sociale, in Lav. dir., 2011. 
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Treaty is, in fact, relevant the totally unprecedented reference to the 
inspirational principles of the EU’s external action that mark a crucial leap 
forward in the logic of inter-normativity between trade policies and 
protection of social rights. The new article 205 of the TFEU establishes that 
the action of the Union on the international scene lies on the principles, 
pursues the goals and is conducted complying with the general provisions 
of the Chapter I of the Title V of the EU Treaty. The reference is in particular 
to the art. 21 of the Chapter I, which states that the inspiring principles of 
the EU’s action are “democracy, the State subject to the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
the respect of human dignity, the principles of equality and of solidarity 
and the respect of the principles of the Charter of UN and of international 
law”. 
The introduction of these general provisions applicable to the totality 
of the EU’s external actions, international trade included, represents one 
of the main systematic innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, which opens 
unprecedented perspectives in the regulation of the global market, not only 
according to principles of profit, but of democracy and respect of human 
rights.  
Another significant innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is to be read in this 
perspective: it is relative to the goals of the relations “with the rest of the 
world” and it states that the EU affirms and promotes its values and 
“contributes” to the “sustainable development of the Earth”, to “solidarity” 
and to “fair and equal trade”, as well as “to the elimination of poverty and 
to the protection of human rights” (art. 3 TUE). The Lisbon Treaty 
represents in this sense a peculiar stage towards a renewed commitment 
on the part of the EU in the promotion of core labour standards, by easing 
the ILO’s normative action and promoting its respect in the field of its 
external relations, with particular (but not exclusive) reference to the trade 
and common investment policies. Therefore, we need to deeply ponder on 
the main sense of this innovation and on the operational possibilities that 
it opens, with particular emphasis on the notion of free and fair trade.  
We may groundedly argue, in this sense, that behind this formula (and 
behind “sustainable development”) we have an idea of market and trade 
that is by all means opposed to the one of neo-liberalistic free market, 
founded on the legitimating of social dumping, on the Darwinian 
competition between social systems and juridical orders. We have a 
different vision of trade: a fair trade complying with the rules, the principles 
of equality, solidarity and correctness within exchanges; a trade (and an 
economic development) that is not to be founded on competitive 
devaluation of social regimes, but, on the contrary to become an occasion 
to promote the EU’s values and principles, such as that of sustainable 
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development 
As a matter of fact, it is not easy to explain the meaning of the concept 
of fair trade. According to a more restrictive merely economic hypothesis, 
fair trade alludes to an organization of international trade exchanges that 
may ensure an equal sharing of trade flows. The right quantity of 
exportations and importations for each Country would then be the one 
guaranteeing the equilibrium of the bilateral trade balance with each 
partner. The issue related to equality may be utilized also to claim an equal 
treatment of economic actors, by reason of which Governments should 
grant their national enterprises the same advantages of their foreign 
competitors. We find in this meaning of equality the idea of a level playing 
field among players that is achievable both through the elimination of 
unfair advantages of foreign enterprises, and through compensational 
mechanisms. Also in this perspective, the idea of fair trade breaks up one 
of the cornerstones of social dumping, that is to say the principle of 
comparative advantages as a foundation of international trade policies. As 
a matter of fact, social dumping, that consists in less strict labour standards 
within exporting fields, is a possible cause of distortion of trade flows, that 
may be caused by a “failure” of the government in the enforcement of 
labour rights: basically it is definable as an “unfair subsidy” that legitimates 
the activation of the procedure to impose compensational duties, according 
to an interpretative line suggested in the cases of environmental dumping, 
where the tolerance of some Countries with respect to environmental 
degradation (particularly typical of developing Countries) would result in a 
sort of subsidization for national industry.  
We may formulate a more extensive interpretation of the notion of fair 
trade in a social perspective by increasing the value of the formulation of 
the Havana Charter, forefather of forthcoming (however, as reminded 
never constituted) International Trade Organization (ITO), whereby not 
only was it provided the obligation to comply with “equal labour 
conditions”, but, even the necessity of a institutional bridge between the 
ILO and the ITO, in the direction of a profitable integration between 
liberalization and social standards. 
Considering all this, the idea of fair trade re-launches the above-
mentioned thesis according to which social dumping may be included within 
subsidizations granted by the State, as an attribution of an advantage to 
enterprises that falls on the lower cost of the product. However, in this 
perspective, the usage of the art. XVI of the GATT in social matters – 
according to a perspective put forward also by the International 
Metalworkers Federation and analysed by the ILO’s International Office of 
Labour – presumes such an extensive interpretation of the concept of 
subsidization that it would include in itself the inertia of the State that 
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artificially (and with active will) keeps sub-standards labour conditions. 
The will to promote an external action that may be coherent with the 
promotion and the protection of fundamental social rights is obtained from 
the analysis of the trade agreements with third Countries.  
The same methodology used in the TTIP, CETA and EPA,  was followed 
in the ambit of free trade agreement with Korea and the EU-Cariforum 
Economic Partnership Agreement, which could be considered as another 
exemplification of the EU’s approach in this matter, by referring to the 
respect, the promotion and the effective application of core labour rights, 
the application of the ILO’s Conventions and the commitment in order that 
the policies of foreign direct investment are not encouraged by 
compromise-oriented reductions within the internal legislation in matter of 
health and security in the workplace or in the de-regulation of core labour 
standards 115.  
In the same way, in the Cariforum Agreement, that is operating within 
the relationships among the EU and all the Countries of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), the Preamble refers to the commitment to the 
respect of “basic labour rights”, with specific reference to “rights” and not 
merely standards or principles; further, the priorities of cooperation 
provide for a precise commitment in order to “facilitate the development 
and the respect of internationally recognized environmental and social 
standards” (art. 8).  
In this perspective, the compliance with international labour law 
results as incorporated in the goals of growth and of development, to the 
extent that – and this is the most innovative part of the Agreement – “the 
behaviour of investors is directly interested. Investors must comply with 
the ILO’s core labour standards” (art. 72). The art. 74, relative to the 
maintenance in activity of social standards, states with even greater energy 
that the parties shall ensure that the “foreign direct investments are not 
encouraged by relaxing the labour standards in matter of labour and health 
in the workplace”. Despite the enforcement of this provision is entrusted to 
single Countries, however under the control of the ILO, this clause sends a 
clear message to potential foreign investors, in order for them to seriously 
adopt praxis of “social responsibility”, instead of recurring to rhetorical as 
much as inoffensive calls of ethic-social principles. 
Finally, we would like to point out a new tendency regarding the 
promotion of the compliance of social rights: the inclusion of labour 
provisions is more often legitimized in terms of human rights, and also 
increasingly in terms of sustainable development. As a matter of fact, 
labour standards are included in so-called chapters on “Trade and 
                                
115 See art. 72 of the EU-Cariforum Agreement. 
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Sustainable Development”, devoted to social and environmental goals, as 
we saw for TTIP, CETA and EPA.  
The concept of sustainable development has allowed for a large 
political consensus within Europe, to support the inclusion of labour 
standards in trade agreements. Probably social clauses have finally found 
an ideal and conceptual paradigm capable of providing new legitimacy and 
a new impetus for their incorporation into international trade treaties. This 
new legitimation also benefited from the legislative action of the ILO, which 
has become the qualified “reference point” for the social pillar of 
sustainable development; and this happened also thanks to the choice 
made by the ILO, and that in the end proved to be right116, to define the 
core labour standards with the 1998 Declaration. This choice has in fact 
allowed to identify in a more specific and clear way the contents of the 
social clause (I mean the minimum contents that should exist in any social 
clause), without evidently setting aside the other conventions and 
therefore the variety and richness of international labour law. 
Sustainable Development is, indeed, an economic theory as well as 
juridical and ethical. Development is often understood as a synonym for 
economic development or economic growth. Sustainable development 
builds and modifies the international approach to development which needs 
to be understood more broadly. In the international community 
development in the past half-century includes at least four related 
concepts: peace and security, economic development, social development 
and national governance that secures peace and development. Each 
concept is reflected in major multilateral treaties that provide a common 
framework for relations among nations as well as a shared set of national 
purposes. In particular, I would like to point out the idea that Social and 
economic development are closely related, not only conceptually, but also 
in the practices of social and economic relationships. Countries that have 
emphasized education, health and related aspects of social development 
tend to have the best economic performance. Therefore, the link between 
economic and social sphere is not an unnatural invention and it’s not 
related to utopia or ideology. It’s not for nothing that a fundamental Treaty 
on human rights, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights contains in itself the idea of integration between economic 
and social sphere.  
Nowadays, the UN, with its 2030 Agenda for sustainable development 
pursues an integrated vision with economic, social, environmental aspects; 
and a specific point (number 8) is related to employment and decent work, 
                                
116 See B. Langille, Core Labour Rights - The True Story (Reply to Alston), in EJIL, Vol. 16 
no.3, 2005, p. 409 
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and they provide to push on the promotion of sustained, inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth and full, productive employment and decent 
work for all.  In particular point 8.8 of the agenda concerns the protection 
of labour rights and the promotion of safe and secure working 
environments for all workers, including migrant workers and those in 
precarious employment. So, labour standards are fully presents in the 
conceptual framework and in the political agenda of Sustainable 
Development, and can constitute a new important element of theoretical 
and practical justification for the law systems at national117, international 
and supranational level118. At the same time, labour law is undoubtedly an 
element of that paradigm, capable of providing a response to coordination 
failures and imperfections which are inherent in the labour market and 
contribute to economic development and growth119. 
It is evident that, inside the Sustainable Development paradigm, the 
economic matter matches with the political-institutional, juridical and 
ethical matter. Basically, through the paradigm of Sustainable 
Development, some values coming from afar are reconsidered and are 
today re-discovered by a non-standard economic thought. Moral concepts 
such as prudence, social justice, equity are thus revitalized, and a 
particular emphasis is placed on the use of fundamental social rights in 
achieving Sustainable Development120.  
The most accomplished example of this trend is offered by the 
European Model of Sustainable Development, from the Amsterdam Treaty 
of the EU that declared that one of the objectives of the European Union is 
to promote economic and social progress and to achieve balanced and 
sustainable development, to the Lisbon Declaration in 2000, where the 
European Council set for the Union the strategic ambitious goal of 
                                
117 This is why Sustainable Development can be considered as a new paradigm for Italian 
Labour Law, to exit from the current crisis and to stop the de-regulation process. See A. 
Perulli, Il contratto a tutele crescenti e la Naspi: un mutamento di “paradigma” per il diritto 
del Lavoro? in A. Perulli, L. Fiorillo, Contratto a tutele crescenti e Naspi, Decreti legislativi 4 
marzo 2015, n. 22 e n. 23, Giappichelli, Torino, 2015; A. Perulli, L’idea di diritto del lavoro, 
oggi, in A. Perulli (a cura di), L’idea di diritto del lavoro, oggi. In ricordo di Giorgio Ghezzi, 
Cedam, Padova, 2016, p. XLI; H. Arthurs, Labour Law After Labour, in G. Davidov, B. Langille 
(eds), The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; B. Langille, Labour 
Law's Theory of Justice, ibidem, p. 101; V. Speziale, La mutazione genetica del diritto del 
lavoro, in Dir. lav. mer., 2016, 2. 
118 See T. Novitz, The Paradigm of Sustainability in a European Social Context: Collective 
Participation in Protection of Future Interests?, IJCLLIR, 2015, 243; T. Treu, Labour Law and 
Sustainable Development, WP CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona”.INT-130/2016 
119 See S. Deakin, The Contribution of Labour Law to Economic Development and Growth, 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 478, March 2016 
120 See R. Zahn & D. Mangan, Labour Standards and Sustainable Development: Unpicking the 
EU’s Approach, IJCLLIR, 2015, 233. 
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becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion121. Another important innovation 
introduced by the Treaty that can be interpreted in this context, regarding 
the goals of relations “with the wider world”, according to which the EU 
upholds and promotes its values and among other things “contributes […] 
to the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and […] free and 
fair trade” as well as to the “eradication of poverty and the protection of 
human rights” (Art. 3 TUE).  In order to comply with a strategy of 
Sustainable economic growth, when the EU re-planned the regulations on 
GPS (the generalized preference systems which allows favourable 
conditions to PVS in trade matters) in the field of its external relations, it 
has titled this chapter “Sustainable and Good Governance”. In the same 
perspective, within the TTIP negotiations between EU and USA, they are 
discussing the social clause within a chapter of the Treaty dealing with 
Sustainable Development122. More generally it can be surely stated that, 
thanks to this paradigm, the promotion of the international labour rights 
has become part of a wider frame on Trade and Sustainable Development 
assuming the status of “unobjectionable norm” in EU trade agreement123. 
                                
121 The European Commission works to ensure that EU trade policy evolves to meet the Union’s 
overarching economic and political aims, including by enhancing coherence between trade 
policy and other EU external and internal policies. For example, trade policy contributes to 
the integrated policy-making of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by focusing 
not only on economic aspects, but also furthering social and environmental objectives, and 
contributes to the European Agenda on Migration and the European Agenda on Security 
(Brussels, 13.9.2017 COM (2017) 492 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy 
to Harness Globalisation; WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, Reflections and 
scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, European Commission COM (2017) 2025 of 1 March 2017).  
122 See A. Perulli, Sustainability, Social Rights and International Trade: The TTIP, IJCLLIR, 
2015, 473 
123 See L. Van Den Putte & J. Orbie, EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Surprising Rise of 
Labour Provisions, IJCLLIR, 2015, 263. The approach of the EU to social issues in the sphere 
of external action consists of two main perspectives. On the one hand, it has a highly 
developed practice in including human rights clauses in its international agreements (including 
regional trade agreements) which allow for the suspension of the agreement in the event that 
one of the parties violates human rights or democratic principles. On the other, it deals with 
social matters, including labour standards, by way of co-operation, entailing where necessary 
financial and technical assistance. For instance, concerning the Agreement which contains a 
type of human/social rights clause on the model of EU agreements, we can make reference 
to the EU-Algeria Association Agreement, the EU-Jordan Agreement, the EU Chile Agreement, 
and the EU-Syria Agreement, in which the term “fundamental social rights” is used for the 
purpose of “giving priority to such rights” or to “recognize the responsibility to guarantee 
basic social rights”. In the Cotonou Agreement the parties have incorporated legally binding 
standards “reaffirming their commitment to the internationally recognized core labour 
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Inside this complex framework, there is an important evolutionary 
perspective to be attentively considered. As far as now, it was the social 
dimension to push on the trade dimension to find acknowledgement. 
Today, the situation is far more balanced and it is the current trade sphere 
to be interested in internalizing the social concerns coming from the 
society, as there would be a failure in achieving any sort of growth, without 
taking social issues into consideration. As a matter of fact, as a Nobel prize 
winner has recently written, the failures of globalization must be attributed 
to the fact that the international economic institutions have been mainly 
driven by commercial and financial interests and eventually, a very much 
peculiar vision of the role of governments and markets has prevailed; 
consequently, the trade agreements have been unfair, because they have 
favoured the advanced nations to the detriment of workers, both in 
advanced Countries and developing Countries124. This is demonstrated by 
the substantial failure of the policies – dating back to the 80’s – of IMF, WB 
and WTO. As a matter of fact, the Countries which actually followed their 
prescriptions did not achieve any economic development nor democracy125. 
In almost all Countries involved into such policies, the effect has been a 
massive increase of debts versus foreign creditors, and heavy cuts of public 
funds to the welfare, education, health system, infrastructures.  
As a consequence, if up until a recent past the matter of social clause 
merely involved the field of a perspective of “resistance” to the most 
negative effects of the liberalization of markets, with all the possible 
reserves on a strategy of Western economic systems accused of “masked 
protectionism”, the evolution of globalization, with its failures and 
contradictions, allows to position the matter in a wider and ambitious 
perspective today: as an aspect of the dynamic inter-relation between the 
sphere of the international market’s regulation and the development of 
non-trade, social and environmental policies; more generally, in the field 
of possible international or even global economic policies126, within the 
range of a Sustainable Development paradigm.  
Considering this, the current challenge is neither to liberalize the trade 
regime, nor to go back to anti-historic nationalisms, but to make the 
                                
standards, as defined by the relevant International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions”; 
see A. Perulli, Fundamental Social Rights, market Regulation and EU External Action, IJCLLIR, 
2014, 41. 
124 J. E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontent Revisited. Anti-Globalization in the Era of 
Trump, 2002, 2018. 
125 See S. Sassen, Expulsion: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Pres, 2014. 
126 Cfr. H. W. Arthurs, Extraterritoriality by Other Means: How labour Law Sneaks Across 
Borders, Conquers Minds, and Controls Workplaces Abroad, Comparative Research in Law & 
Political Economy. Research Paper No. 25/2010. 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 95 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 146/2018 
existing trade openness sustainable and compatible with the idea of social 
justice. 
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